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The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution in general and 
the Reconstruction Amendments in particular substantially constrain the ability of legislative 
and executive actors to address a variety of hot-button political issues, including abortion, gay 
rights, and affirmative action. So important are the Court’s decisions that the ability to 
appoint Justices who will shift the Court’s direction has been a central issue in recent 
presidential campaigns. Throughout history, decisive shifts in the Court’s composition have 
resulted in correspondingly dramatic shifts in constitutional doctrine. Yet surprisingly, these 
dramatic shifts have occurred with the Court rarely overturning any precedent. 
Although others have identified selected instances of the Court engaging in stealth 
revision of precedent, this Article is both the first to provide a detailed taxonomy of the methods 
employed and to exhaustively consider their use in construing the Reconstruction Amendments. 
This stealth process, which this Article refers to as judicial reconstruction, occurs when the 
Court employs one or more of three different methods of transforming constitutional  
doctrine: selective quotation of precedent; re-characterization of precedent; and citations to 
“dissenting concurrences”—separate opinions in earlier cases that are concurrences in form 
but dissents in substance. Through the use of these methods, liberal and conservative justices 
alike have dramatically transformed constitutional law even when their decisions are 
unsupported by and at times diametrically at odds with the Court’s earlier precedents. 
This Article concludes that U.S. Senators and commentators, with their almost  
laser-like focus on fidelity to stare decisis during the confirmation process, have  
overlooked—and perhaps even fostered—the opaque practice of reconstructing rather than the 
transparent process of overruling precedent. It further concludes that those examining judicial 
nominees’ commitment to respecting precedent should examine not merely their formal fidelity 
to stare decisis but instead their history of and views on reconstructing precedent.  
 
* William L. Dwyer Endowed Chair in Law, University of Washington. I am indebted to my research 
assistant, Marten King, for his assistance, editing, and feedback. I also wish to thank Helen A. Anderson, 
Mary D. Fan, Robert Gomulkiewicz, Maureen A. Howard, Lisa Marshall Manheim, Hugh Spitzer, and 
Kathryn Watts for their valuable suggestions and feedback. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States today, legislative and executive discretion to address 
certain divisive political issues—including abortion,1 gay rights,2 gun control,3 
religious freedom,4 and affirmative action5—is circumscribed by U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions that curtail such discretion, because it interferes with individual 
rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by various constitutional provisions, most 
 
1. E.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
2. E.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
3. E.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008). 
4. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
5. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
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notably the Reconstruction Amendments.6 Because the freedom to address such 
issues is judicially constrained, a major focus of each presidential election cycle is 
on the number of new U.S. Supreme Court Justices each candidate will likely be 
able to appoint and its probable impact on future legislative and  
executive discretion.7 
Such discussions recur each time a vacancy actually arises during a President’s 
term, with commentators asking whether the appointment will result in the newly 
composed Court overruling some or all of the Court’s earlier decisions and legal 
pundits sparring on the legitimacy of the Court overruling precedent.8 During 
confirmation hearings, in which nominees rarely express an opinion on the 
constitutional issues themselves, nominees are instead intensively grilled on their 
fidelity to the doctrine of stare decisis, particularly where constitutional decisions  
are involved.9 
Yet despite the Court’s frequent lurches leftward or rightward throughout 
history, the Court almost never explicitly overrules any of its constitutional 
decisions. Decisions such as Lawrence v. Texas,10 which struck down a state law 
criminalizing consensual sodomy and in so doing explicitly overruled its earlier 
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,11 are exceedingly rare. 
This is not to say that the Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution has 
remained consistent over time or that the appointment of new Justices has no 
impact on the trajectory of the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, were 
one to compare the Court’s decisions interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments 
in the decades immediately following their ratification with the Court’s modern 
decisions regarding those same provisions, one might well conclude that the 
decisions were the products of two diametrically opposite constitutional systems. 
This is so despite the absence of any relevant constitutional amendments during the 
interim period and few explicit instances of overruling precedent. 
In this Article, I identify and describe a stealth process of judicial reconstruction 
of precedent that often achieves the same end result as explicitly overruling 
 
6.  The phrase “Reconstruction Amendments” is used throughout this Article to refer to the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which were enacted by Congress and ratified by 
the States in the years immediately following the Civil War. 
7.  See, e.g., Ari Berman, The Supreme Court Is the Most Important Issue in the 2016 Election, 
NATION (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-supreme-court-is-the-most-
important-issue-in-the-2016-election/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ8V-B2VK]. 
8.  See, e.g., Dylan Mathews, America After Anthony Kennedy: What Kennedy’s Departure from the 
Supreme Court Will Mean for Abortion, Gay Rights, and More, VOX ( last updated June 27, 2018, 2:07 
PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/6/25/17461318/anthony-kennedy-ideology-
retirement-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/S58Q-QNU5]. 
9.  See, e.g., Tucker Higgins, Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Says Landmark Abortion 
Ruling Roe v. Wade Is ‘An Important Precedent,’ CNBC ( last updated Sept. 5, 2018, 3:12 PM), https:/
/www.cnbc.com/2018/09/05/supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaugh-says-landmark-abortion-
ruling-roe-v-wade-is-important-precedent.html [https://perma.cc/6FSC-SSR9]. 
10. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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precedent. This process of judicial reconstruction occurs when the Court employs 
one or more of three different methods of transforming constitutional doctrine. 
First, selective quotation of precedent, in which the Court purports to rely on earlier 
precedent via direct quotation but does so in a selective way that distorts, sometimes 
dramatically, their actual holdings. Second, re-characterization of precedent, in 
which the Court, without directly quoting its earlier decisions, characterizes them as 
standing for something quite different than the earlier decisions actually held. Third, 
quoting from “dissenting concurrences,” in which the Court quotes not from a 
majority opinion but from a separate opinion that is a concurrence in form but a 
dissent in substance. Through the use of these methods, Justices are able to 
dramatically transform constitutional law even when their decisions are 
unsupported by and at times diametrically at odds with the Court’s earlier 
precedents. These methods have been used by liberal and conservative Justices alike 
to either expand or contract the scope of various constitutional provisions. 
Although others have identified selected instances of the Court engaging in 
stealth revision of precedent,12 this is both the first article to provide a detailed 
taxonomy of the methods employed and to exhaustively consider their use in 
construing the Reconstruction Amendments. It proceeds in three parts. Part I 
comprehensively demonstrates how the Court has re-shaped the meaning of the 
Reconstruction Amendments through the process of judicial reconstruction. Part II 
identifies selected examples of the Court re-shaping other constitutional doctrines 
through a similar process. Part III identifies examples of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions that are vulnerable to conservative judicial reconstruction now that 
President Trump’s appointments have shifted the Court’s composition in a more 
decidedly conservative direction, as well as examples of decisions that would be 
vulnerable to liberal judicial reconstruction if the Court’s composition were to shift 
in a decidedly liberal direction in the future. 
This Article concludes that U.S. Senators and commentators, with their almost 
laser-like focus on fidelity to stare decisis during the confirmation process, have 
overlooked—and perhaps even fostered—the opaque practice of reconstructing 
rather than the transparent process of overruling precedent. It further concludes 
that those examining the commitment of judicial nominees to respecting precedent 
should examine not merely their formal fidelity to stare decisis but instead their 
history of and views on reconstructing precedent. 
Such a shift in focus from formal to actual fidelity to precedent will serve two 
 
12. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of 
the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 466–67 (1974) 
(asserting that Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. silently overruled The Civil Rights Cases); Michael  
J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 181 (1998) (contending 
that The Slaughter-House Cases were “functionally overruled” by Lochner v. New York). See generally Barry 
Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling, 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 9, 12 (2010); Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of 
Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 202 (2014); Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861 (2014). 
First to Printer_Nicolas.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/30/20  4:13 PM 
2020] RECONSTRUCTION 941 
important purposes. First, assuming nominees answer questions truthfully during 
the confirmation process, it will allow Senators, commentators, and the public to 
better gauge the nominee’s impact on the future trajectory of constitutional law. 
Second, by shedding light on the process of stealth transformation of precedent and 
treating it as the equivalent of explicitly overruling precedent, Justices will no longer 
be incentivized to engage in the stealth process of reconstructing precedent without 
justifying their actions. Instead, when a case arises in which overruling precedent 
seems justifiable, they will explicitly overrule the earlier cases and explain their 
rationales for doing so instead of hiding behind a formal veil of fidelity to stare decisis 
that allows them to depart radically from precedent without justifying their decision 
to the public. 
I. JUDICIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments 
has undergone a seismic shift between when the Amendments were ratified and the 
present day. The Court’s opinions in the decades immediately following the Civil 
War suggested that the Reconstruction Amendments were quite limited in their 
reach. In contrast, the Court’s decisions in the 1960s and 1970s suggested that the 
Reconstruction Amendments were breathtakingly broad in reach. The Court’s more 
recent decisions fall somewhere in between those two poles. But over this entire 
period, in which the doctrine changed dramatically, the Court rarely overturned any 
of its precedent. 
These dramatic shifts in the Court’s precedents interpreting the 
Reconstruction Amendments have been accomplished through a stealth process 
whereby the Court, instead of overturning inconvenient precedent, reconstructs the 
earlier precedent to conform with the direction in which the Court wishes to shift 
the doctrine. This process takes place when the Court employs one or more of three 
different methods of transforming constitutional doctrine: selective quotation of 
precedent, re-characterization of precedent, and quotation from  
“dissenting concurrences.” 
A. Selective Quotation of Precedent 
One of the easiest ways to change the meaning of an earlier precedent to make 
it appear to support a new proposition is to directly quote a limited passage from 
the earlier decision stripped from its context. Four contemporary U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments—Reynolds v. Sims,13 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,14 Loving v. Virginia,15 and Lawrence v. Texas16—are 
demonstrative of this technique for transforming constitutional law. 
 
13. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
14. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
15. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
16. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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1. Reynolds and the Fundamental Right to Vote 
In Reynolds, the Court declared unconstitutional apportionment plans for 
legislative districts in several states on the ground that the populations in the 
proposed districts were unequal.17 The Court’s rationale for invalidating the 
districting scheme was that the right to vote is a fundamental right protected by the 
Equal Protection Clause and that weighing the votes of different people differently 
by means of malapportionment was equivalent to denial of the right to vote.18 
This was a rather remarkable result given that the Court had previously 
rejected arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment in any way protected the right 
to vote. Ninety years earlier, the Court in Minor v. Happersett19 rejected a claim that 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause provided a basis for 
declaring unconstitutional state laws preventing women from voting. The Minor 
Court identified two structural aspects of the Constitution that made clear that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not in any way protect the right to vote. First, the Court 
noted that pursuant to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state’s 
representation in Congress was to be diminished to the extent it denied the right to 
vote to males over twenty-one years of age.20 Minor reasoned that the existence of 
this penalty-in-representation provision necessarily implied that states remained free 
to disenfranchise people.21 Second, the Court noted that Congress and the States 
deemed it necessary to adopt the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited denial of 
the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Minor concluded that if the Fourteenth Amendment already protected the right to 
vote generally, the Fifteenth Amendment would have been redundant.22 
The Reynolds Court got around the seemingly insurmountable stumbling block 
of Minor by ignoring it altogether, not mentioning the case once in the course of its 
opinion and leading the dissent to charge that the majority had “disregarded” and 
“silently overruled” the decision.23 Instead, the Court relied exclusively on a quote 
from an earlier case to support its conclusion that voting is a fundamental right 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause: “Almost a 
century ago, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court referred to ‘the political franchise of 
voting’ as ‘a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.’”24 
Stripped of its context, a reader of the Reynolds opinion would likely assume that the 
right to vote was at issue in Yick Wo. However, the case had nothing whatsoever to 
do with voting rights. Rather, Yick Wo involved an equal protection challenge to a 
 
17. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. 
18. See id. at 561–62. 
19. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874). 
20. See id. at 174–75. 
21. See id. at 174. 
22. See id. at 175. 
23. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 612 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
24. See id. at 562 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118  
U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). 
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statute that required laundries to be located in certain types of buildings absent a 
waiver.25 Although the statute was facially neutral, every Chinese applicant was 
denied a waiver while all but one non-Chinese applicant was granted a waiver.26 The 
Court held that the threshold requirement for making out an equal protection claim 
is satisfied when a facially neutral law is administered in a discriminatory manner, 
and it also appeared to hold that the extreme discriminatory effects of the law, 
standing alone, satisfy the threshold requirement of an equal protection claim.27 
Yick Wo’s reference to voting was merely one of several examples the Court 
gave of ways in which the “nature and theory of our institutions of government” 
do not allow for the exercise of arbitrary power.28 Indeed, the Yick Wo Court 
acknowledged that voting is “not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege 
merely conceded by society, according to its will.”29 Yet, by selectively quoting from 
dicta in Yick Wo, the Reynolds Court effectively overruled its decision in Minor 
without so stating and created a new constitutional principle that lacked any support 
in precedent. The Court repeated this selective citation of Yick Wo in Harper v. 
Virginia State Board of Elections,30 where the Court declared unconstitutional state 
poll taxes on the ground that they unconstitutionally denied those who failed to pay 
it the fundamental right to vote.31 
Thereafter, the Court no longer cited Yick Wo in cases involving the 
fundamental right to vote. Having distorted the Yick Wo dicta in Reynolds and 
Harper, the Court subsequently cited those two cases,32 in effect laundering their 
distortion of precedent through them. 
2. Jones and Congressional Power to “Enforce” the Thirteenth Amendment 
The Thirteenth Amendment—enacted and ratified in the wake of the Civil 
War—contains two sections. Section 1 creates a blanket prohibition on slavery or 
involuntary servitude, while Section 2 grants Congress the power to “enforce” the 
Thirteenth Amendment by “appropriate legislation.” In one of the earliest decisions 
to interpret Section 2, the Court in The Civil Rights Cases33 gave Section 2 a limited 
interpretation that caused the constitutional provision to lay largely dormant for 
nearly a century. Yet by selectively quoting from The Civil Rights Cases, the Court in 
Jones dramatically transformed the scope of congressional power under Section 2. 
In The Civil Rights Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited discrimination 
 
25. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357. 
26. See id. at 374. 
27. See id. at 373–74. 
28. See id. at 369–70. 
29. See id. at 370. 
30. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
31. Id. at 667–68. 
32. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,  
336 (1972). 
33. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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on the basis of race by places of public accommodation. One argument made in the 
case was that Congress was empowered to enact the provisions pursuant to Section 
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. To address this argument, The Civil Rights Cases 
Court was willing to assume arguendo that Section 2 empowered Congress to 
prohibit not merely slavery itself but also the so-called “badges and incidents of 
slavery.”34 Specifically, the Court wrote that “it is assumed, that the power vested in 
Congress to enforce the article by appropriate legislation, clothes Congress with 
power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents 
of slavery in the United States.”35 Describing this as “the major proposition” at issue 
in the case, the Court went on to ask whether or not “the minor proposition [was] 
also true, that the denial to any person of admission to the accommodations and 
privileges of an inn, a public conveyance, or a theatre, does subject that person to 
any form of servitude, or tend to fasten upon him any badge of slavery?”36 The 
Court went on to conclude that denial of admission to public accommodations did 
not constitute a “badge” or “incident” of slavery, engaging in its own analysis of the 
meaning of those terms without any deference to Congress.37 By thus rejecting the 
“minor proposition,” the Court was able to avoid directly deciding whether Section 
2 even empowered Congress to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery. 
Nearly a century passed before the Court revisited the scope of congressional 
power under Section 2. In Jones, the Court considered the constitutionality of a 
federal statute that prohibited racial discrimination in the sale or rental of real 
property.38 The Jones Court concluded that Congress had the power to enact the 
statute pursuant to Section 2. In so holding, the Jones Court made three legal 
conclusions: that Section 2 empowered Congress not merely to enact laws regarding 
slavery and indentured servitude, but also the badges and incidents thereof;39 that 
the Court would defer to Congress’s rational determination that something 
constituted a badge or incident of slavery;40 and that Congress’s conclusion that 
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of real property was a badge or incident of 
slavery was a rational one.41 
In support of its first legal conclusion, the Jones Court purported to rely 
directly upon The Civil Rights Cases: 
“By its own unaided force and effect,” the Thirteenth Amendment 
“abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.” Civil Rights Cases. 
Whether or not the Amendment itself did any more than that—a question 
not involved in this case—it is at least clear that the Enabling Clause of 
that Amendment empowered Congress to do much more. For that clause 
 
34. Id. at 20. 
35. Id. (emphasis added). 
36. Id. at 20–21. 
37. Id. at 21–25. 
38. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412–37 (1968). 
39. See id. at 439–40. 
40. See id. at 440. 
41. See id. at 440–41. 
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clothed “Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for 
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”  
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)42 
Thus, by leaving out the prefatory phrase “it is assumed,” the Jones Court was 
able to make it appear as though The Civil Rights Cases provided direct support for 
the proposition that Section 2 empowers Congress to enact legislation designed to 
abolish the badges and incidents of slavery, a question actually reserved by The Civil 
Rights Cases Court. 
After concluding that Congress could legislate to abolish the badges and 
incidents of slavery, Jones proceeded to make its second legal conclusion: that 
“Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine 
what are the badges and the incidents of slavery.”43 Unlike for its first conclusion, 
however, Jones did not rely on The Civil Rights Cases to support giving deference to 
Congress. In fact, Jones ignored the non-deferential approach undertaken in The 
Civil Rights Cases and instead based its second conclusion primarily upon remarks 
by key members of the Congress that enacted the Thirteenth Amendment.44 
For the Jones Court’s third conclusion, that it was rational to treat racial 
discrimination in the sale or rental of real property as a badge or incident of slavery, 
Jones switched tactics and purported once again to rely directly upon The Civil  
Rights Cases: 
[T]his Court recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have 
encompassed, the badges and incidents of slavery—its “burdens and 
disabilities”—included restraints upon “those fundamental rights which 
are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right . . . to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 
Civil Rights Cases.45 
The Jones Court again quoted directly from The Civil Rights Cases in an 
accompanying footnote: 
[T]he entire Court [in The Civil Rights Cases] agreed upon at least one 
proposition: The Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress not only to 
outlaw all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude but also to eradicate 
the last vestiges and incidents of a society half slave and half free, by 
securing to all citizens, of every race and color, “the same right to make 
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”46 
Together, these two quotes make it appear as though the Court in The Civil 
Rights Cases concluded that restrictions on the sale or rental of real property 
constituted a badge or incident of slavery. Yet a closer look at the quoted language 
 
42. Id. at 439. 
43. See id. at 440. 
44. See id. 
45. Id. at 441. 
46. Id. at 441 n.78. 
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in context paints a starkly different story. In these two quotes, the Court in The Civil 
Rights Cases was directly quoting the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
Referencing this Act, the Court in The Civil Rights Cases went on to state: 
Whether this legislation was fully authorized by the Thirteenth 
Amendment alone, without the support which it afterward received from 
the Fourteenth Amendment, after the adoption of which it was re-enacted 
with some additions, it is not necessary to inquire. It is referred to for the 
purpose of showing that at that time (in 1866) Congress did not assume, 
under the authority given by the Thirteenth Amendment, to adjust what 
may be called the social rights of men and races in the community.47 
In other words, without deciding whether Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment in fact authorized Congress to enact the provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, the majority in The Civil Rights Cases assumed that the 1866 Act 
represented the ceiling on the type of legislation that fell within the scope of 
congressional power under Section 2 and concluded that legislation regulating racial 
discrimination by places of public accommodation—the subject of the provision of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 at issue in The Civil Rights Cases—fell outside  
that scope. 
In sum, through the process of selective quotation, the Court in Jones was able 
to transform a precedent that narrowly interpreted congressional power under 
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment into one that appeared to provide support 
for broad congressional power under that provision. 
3. Loving and the Fundamental Right to Marry 
In Loving v. Virginia,48 the Court declared unconstitutional on two grounds a 
state law criminalizing interracial marriage. Although the Court’s decision focused 
primarily on the fact that the statute created a race-based classification that did not 
satisfy strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause,49 the Court alternatively held that the statute violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it interfered with the fundamental right 
to marry.50 
The Court has relied upon the latter holding to justify striking down a variety 
of laws restricting the right to marry that do not draw race-based distinctions, 
including restrictions on marriage by those who are in arrears of child support 
obligations,51 prisoners,52 and same-sex couples.53 Accordingly, the doctrinal 
soundness of this entire line of cases is based on the accuracy of Loving’s assertion 
 
47. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (emphasis added). 
48. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
49. Id. at 7–12. 
50. Id. at 12. 
51. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384–87 (1978). 
52. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94–95 (1987). 
53. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015). 
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that the Court had previously recognized marriage to be a freestanding fundamental 
right protected by the Due Process Clause. 
The Loving Court’s conclusion that marriage is such a right was based almost 
exclusively on the Court’s 1942 decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma.54 Specifically, 
Loving, quoting directly from Skinner, wrote that “[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil 
rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”55 Yet a close 
examination of Skinner reveals that although the word marriage was mentioned by 
the Court in its opinion, the reference to marriage was either dicta or recognition of 
marriage not as a freestanding fundamental right but rather a derivative one. 
At issue in Skinner was the constitutionality of an Oklahoma law providing for 
the sterilization of those convicted for the third time of certain categories of crimes. 
The Court held that the law was subject to strict scrutiny because a fundamental 
right was involved.56 Specifically, the Skinner Court wrote: “We are dealing here 
with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and 
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”57 While 
the reference to procreation in Skinner made sense given that sterilization would 
prevent future procreation, the reference to marriage at first glance seems puzzling 
because the right to marry was itself not directly involved in the case. The easiest 
way to make sense of the reference is to consider that, at the time Skinner was 
decided, sex outside of marriage was in most instances criminalized, and thus 
marriage served as the sole gateway to engaging in lawful acts of procreation.58 Thus, 
because procreation is a fundamental right, marriage—to the extent states choose 
through their criminal laws to make it the only lawful gateway to engaging in 
procreative activity—is a derivative fundamental right.59 The Court’s subsequent 
decision in Zablocki v. Redhail60 appeared to acknowledge the derivative nature of 
the marriage right when it cited a state law criminalizing sex outside of marriage in 
support of its conclusion that “if appellee’s right to procreate means anything at all, 
it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the State of 
Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place.”61 
Accordingly, Skinner’s reference to marriage was either dicta or tied directly to 
procreation, and did not provide clear support for the Loving Court’s conclusion 
that marriage is a freestanding fundamental right.62 This lends credence to Chief 
 
54. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
55. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
56. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 539–42. 
57. Id. at 541. 
58. See Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
331, 345–47 (2016). 
59. See id. 
60. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
61. Id. at 386 n.11. 
62. Save for this isolated, offhanded reference to “marriage,” it is clear from the rest of the 
opinion that the only right at issue in the case is procreation. See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536 (describing 
the deprivation at issue in the case as “the right to have offspring”); id. at 541 (focusing entirely on 
sterilization and its effects on the ability to procreate). 
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Justice Robert’s statement in dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges,63 that because the roots 
of the right to marry are grounded in the right to procreate, it is problematic to 
extend the right to same-sex couples without considering those couples’ inability to 
procreate absent the assistance of third persons.64 
Yet once Loving broke the connection between marriage and procreation by 
referring only to the Skinner Court’s reference to marriage, post-Loving decisions 
have consistently treated marriage as a freestanding fundamental right. Indeed, 
although Loving was based directly on Skinner’s dicta, post-Loving decisions 
describing the types of rights deemed fundamental under the Due Process Clause 
treat Skinner and Loving as representing two distinct lines of precedent, with Skinner 
cited for the proposition that procreation is a fundamental right and Loving cited for 
the proposition that marriage is a fundamental right.65 
4. Lawrence and the Role of History Under the Due Process Clause 
As indicated in the introduction, Lawrence v. Texas is a rare example of a 
modern U.S. Supreme Court case explicitly overruling constitutional precedent. Yet 
Lawrence paved the way to overruling Bowers in part by reconstructing other 
precedent to suggest that Bowers itself was inconsistent with established doctrine.66 
A major point of contention between Lawrence and Bowers was the role that 
history should play in the Court’s recognition of unenumerated rights under the 
Due Process Clause. In a series of cases decided both prior to and after Bowers, the 
Court held that its power to recognize such rights is limited to those “deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition.”67 Citing this precedent, the Bowers Court 
rejected the claim that a right to engage in same-sex sodomy was constitutionally 
protected, noting the ancient roots of laws criminalizing sodomy.68 Yet in Lawrence, 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion criticized the Bowers Court’s historical focus: “In 
all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most 
relevance here . . . . ‘[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases 
the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’”69 The Lawrence Court 
proceeded to identify more recent legal developments that provided support for 
treating same-sex sodomy as a constitutionally protected activity.70 
The key to the Lawrence Court’s ability to reject Bowers’s focus on history is the 
 
63. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
64. See id. at 2614 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
65. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 
116 (1996); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431  
U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973). 
66. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). 
67. E.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(plurality opinion). 
68. See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 191–94 (1986). 
69. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72 (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
70. See id. at 572–73. 
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quoted language describing history and tradition as “the starting point but not in all 
cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” The quote comes 
from Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in County of Sacramento v. Lewis.71 In 
Lewis, all nine Justices rejected a claim that a police officer’s deliberate or reckless 
indifference to life while engaged in a high-speed chase in an effort to apprehend a 
suspect violated the substantive due process rights of those injured as a result of the 
chase, albeit for somewhat different reasons.72 In his concurring opinion in Lewis, 
Justice Kennedy first noted his agreement with Justice Scalia’s conclusion that 
history and tradition did not support the substantive due process right claimed by 
those injured as a result of the high-speed chase.73 This was followed by the language 
quoted in Lawrence, which in context makes clear that the quoted language was 
intended to narrow, rather than to broaden, the scope of substantive due process: 
In the instant case, the authorities cited by Justice Scalia are persuasive, 
indicating that we would contradict our traditions were we to sustain the 
claims of the respondents. 
That said, it must be added that history and tradition are the starting point, 
but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry. 
There is room as well for an objective assessment of the necessities of law 
enforcement, in which the police must be given substantial latitude and 
discretion.74 
In other words, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lewis indicated that even if history 
and tradition provided support for the claimed right, other considerations, including 
the needs of law enforcement, might result in rejection of such a claim. Yet in 
Lawrence, he quotes that language out of context, using it to suggest just the 
opposite, namely, that the Court can recognize a substantive due process right even 
if it lacks support in history and tradition. 
B. Re-characterization of Precedent 
In each of the examples set forth in Part I.A, the Court relied on convenient 
language in earlier decisions stripped of its context to suggest that the earlier 
decisions supported the Court’s legal conclusions when they did not. Where such 
convenient language is not available, the Court has employed a second method of 
reconstructing precedent. With this second method, instead of quoting its earlier 
decisions, the Court simply re-characterizes them as standing for a proposition 
starkly different from what those earlier decisions actually held. 
This method of reconstructing the Court’s decisions interpreting the 
Reconstruction Amendments has arisen in three different circumstances. First, in 
some cases, the Court re-characterizes the ground upon which an earlier case was 
 
71. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
72. Id. at 836. 
73. Id. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing id. at 860–62 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
74. Id. 
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decided, such as by citing a case formally decided on equal protection grounds as 
though it were instead decided on due process grounds. Second, the Court  
re-characterizes earlier cases that applied a lower level of scrutiny, typically rational 
basis review, as though they instead applied a more searching form of scrutiny. 
Third, the Court alters the parameters of an established constitutional doctrine or 
test by re-casting earlier decisions as requiring some key element even though those 
earlier decisions placed no weight on that element. 
Using these various methods of re-characterizing precedent, the Court is often 
able to blaze new legal pathways or narrow the scope of constitutional provisions 
while making it appear as though they are simply applying binding precedent. In 
some instances, this process is abrupt, with a later case describing a predecessor case 
in starkly different terms. In other instances, this process is more gradual, with one 
or more intermediary cases helping to slowly transition the meaning of the root case. 
1. Re-characterizing Ground: The Development of Modern Substantive Due  
Process Jurisprudence 
Contemporary U.S. Supreme Court decisions acknowledging the Court’s 
authority to recognize and enforce unenumerated substantive fundamental rights 
under the Due Process Clause often cite the same seven cases in support of this 
proposition: Meyer v. Nebraska,75 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,76 Skinner v. Oklahoma,77 
Prince v. Massachusetts,78 Griswold v. Connecticut,79 Loving v. Virginia,80 and Eisenstadt 
v. Baird.81 For example, in Carey v. Population Services International82—a case 
recognizing an unenumerated right to procure an abortion—the Court wrote: 
[T]he Court has recognized that one aspect of the “liberty” protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is “a right of 
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.” Roe 
v. Wade . . . . While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been 
marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual 
may make without unjustified government interference are personal 
decisions “relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia; procreation, Skinner  
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson; contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird; family 
relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, and child rearing and education, Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters; Meyer v. Nebraska.”83 
Similar citations to these cases can be found in other contemporary Supreme 
 
75. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
76. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
77. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
78. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
79. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
80. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
81. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
82. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
83. Id. at 684–85 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)) (citations omitted). 
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Court decisions adjudicating other claimed substantive due process rights.84 Yet a 
closer look at these seven precedents will reveal that they in fact provide little direct 
support for the modern theory of recognizing and enforcing unenumerated 
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause. Two of the cases—Skinner and 
Eisenstadt—were formally decided on class-based equal protection grounds. Two of 
the other cases—Meyer and Pierce—were formally based on subsequently repudiated 
Lochner-era precedents interpreting the Due Process Clause to protect “freedom of 
contract.” The remaining three cases—Prince, Griswold, and Loving—were 
themselves re-characterizations of one or more of the first four cases. 
a. A Shift from Equality to Liberty: The Skinner and Eisenstadt Cases 
As shown in Part I.A.3, by selectively quoting from the Court’s decision in 
Skinner, the Loving Court was able to recognize a freestanding fundamental right to 
marry, even though Skinner was a case about procreation. As the quote above from 
Carey demonstrates, post-Loving the Court treated Skinner and Loving as separate 
lines of precedent, with Skinner representing the right to procreate and Loving 
representing the right to marry.85 Yet recognition of a freestanding right to marry is 
not the only way in which Loving reconstructed Skinner. In addition to selectively 
quoting from Skinner, Loving also significantly re-characterized the ground upon 
which the case was decided. 
As explained above, the Court’s decision in Loving rested on two grounds. 
First, that the anti-miscegenation statute created a race-based classification that did 
not satisfy strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.86 And second, that the 
statute violated the Due Process Clause because it interfered with the fundamental 
right to marry.87 It was in the second section of the Court’s opinion regarding the 
Due Process Clause that the Court quoted Skinner.88 
However, the Skinner decision was decided on equal protection, not due 
process, grounds. Recall that at issue in Skinner was the constitutionality of an 
Oklahoma law providing for the sterilization of those convicted for the third time 
of certain categories of crimes. Skinner treated the statute as presenting an equal 
protection problem, focusing on the fact that the statute encompassed only certain 
types of crimes, such as grand larceny, but not others, such as embezzlement.89 
While acknowledging that the distinction between different types of crimes would 
satisfy the rational basis review normally applicable in equal protection challenges, 
 
84. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (physician-assisted suicide); 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (sexual autonomy); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 
414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (right of pregnant public employees to continue working). 
85. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973)) (citations omitted). 
86. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7–12 (1967). 
87. See id. at 12. 
88. See id. 
89. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942). 
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the Court held that strict scrutiny applied where, as here, a fundamental right  
was involved.90 
To be sure, separate concurring opinions in Skinner suggested that the case 
presented either a substantive or a procedural due process problem rather than an 
equal protection one,91 but the majority opinion clearly and unmistakably decided 
the case on equal protection grounds.92 And although the Skinner majority 
recognized the right involved as a fundamental one, the Court’s jurisprudence has 
made an important distinction between fundamental rights recognized under the 
Due Process Clause and those recognized under the Equal Protection Clause. If a 
right is recognized as fundamental under the Due Process Clause, infringement of 
that right is subject to heightened scrutiny even if the government even-handedly 
infringes upon everyone’s exercise of that right.93 In contrast, fundamental rights 
protected by the Equal Protection Clause can be infringed upon or even eliminated 
by the government without raising any constitutional concerns, so long as the 
government does so in an even-handed manner.94 Only if it infringes upon or denies 
the right to some individuals but not others is the government’s conduct subject to 
heightened scrutiny.95 Thus, Loving’s re-casting of Skinner as a due process rather 
than an equal protection fundamental rights case significantly alters the scope of 
the constitutional protection afforded by the right. Post-Loving, the Court has 
carried this re-characterization of Skinner forward by consistently treating it as a due 
process precedent rather than an equal protection one.96 
The Court’s decision in Eisenstadt—cited in Carey for the proposition that the 
Due Process Clause protects personal decisions related to contraception—likewise 
provides little direct support for modern substantive due process jurisprudence. 
Eisenstadt was decided after the Court’s decision in Griswold. In Griswold, the Court 
declared unconstitutional a Connecticut law that criminalized both the use of 
contraceptives by married persons and the distribution of contraceptives to such 
persons.97 Although Griswold invalidated the law, the Justices did not coalesce on a 
basis for doing so. The plurality eschewed reliance on the Due Process Clause, 
 
90. See id. at 539–42. 
91. See id. at 543–45 (Stone, C.J., concurring); id. at 546–47 ( Jackson, J., concurring). 
92. Skinner was decided just a few years after the Court overruled its Lochner-era line of cases, 
and thus the Justices in the majority may have invoked the Equal Protection rather than the Due Process 
Clause to avoid accusations of a return to Lochner. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal  
Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 112, 123 (2007); G. Edward White, 
The Anti-Judge: William O. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REV. 17,  
65–72 (1988). 
93. See Nicolas, supra note 58, at 354. 
94. See id. at 358–59. 
95. See id. 
96. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2854, 2598 (2015); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521  
U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 
431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart,  
J., concurring). 
97. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
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invoking instead what it described as the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights to 
recognize a fundamental right to marital privacy,98 while the concurring opinions 
invoked the Ninth Amendment99 and the Due Process Clause.100 
Eisenstadt, decided seven years after Griswold, involved a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a Massachusetts law that also regulated the use and distribution 
of contraceptives. The Massachusetts statute permitted contraceptive use by and 
distribution to married persons, but it prohibited their use by and distribution to 
unmarried persons.101 Thus, the case was arguably distinguishable from Griswold in 
that no claim to marital privacy could be made. 
Although Eisenstadt hinted that the fundamental right recognized in Griswold 
might logically be extended to unmarried couples—thus requiring strict scrutiny of 
the law at issue—the Court made it clear that it was instead deciding the case on 
class-based equal protection grounds.102 Indeed, the Court was so clear that it was 
not deciding the case on due process grounds that this language has been described 
as “well-known dictum.”103 Purporting to apply no more than rational basis review, 
the Eisenstadt Court declared the Massachusetts law unconstitutional on the ground 
that it irrationally discriminated between married and unmarried persons.104 
Yet despite the clear basis for the Court’s decision in Eisenstadt, it took the 
Court just ten months to re-characterize its holding. In Roe v. Wade,105 the Court 
considered the constitutionality of a pair of state laws restricting or regulating 
abortion. The Court noted that its previous cases had recognized a right to personal 
privacy, although it indicated that there was some uncertainty in the Court’s earlier 
decisions as to whether the source of that right was the penumbras of the Bill of 
Rights, the Ninth Amendment, or the Due Process Clause.106 Roe ultimately 
resolved that uncertainty by identifying the Due Process Clause as the source of that 
right.107 Among the list of cases that Roe cited in support of its conclusion was 
Eisenstadt, which it represented as recognizing a fundamental right to 
contraception.108 The specific pinpoint cite in Roe directs to the section of the 
Eisenstadt opinion in which the Court, in dicta, made reference to the colorable 
 
98. See id. at 484–86 (majority opinion). 
99.   See id. at 486–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
100. See  id.  at  499–500  (Harlan,  J.,  concurring  in  the  judgment);  id.  at  502–08  (White,  J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
101. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442 (1972). 
102. See id. at 446–47, 447 n.7, 452–55. 
103. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 595 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
104. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446–47, 447 n.7, 454. One may rightly be skeptical of the 
Eisenstadt Court’s claim that it was applying only rational basis scrutiny. The Court applied a far more 
exacting standard to the rationales proffered by the government than is the norm under traditional 
rational basis review, rejecting them on the ground that the means-end fit was too loose. See Eisenstadt, 
405 U.S. at 447–52. 
105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
106. See id. at 152. 
107. See id. at 153. 
108. See id. at 152. 
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argument that Griswold might be extended to unmarried persons.109 
Post-Roe, the Court has consistently treated Eisenstadt as a due process 
precedent despite Eisenstadt’s explicit reliance on class-based equal protection 
principles. In some of these post-Roe cases, the Court has briefly mentioned the fact 
that Eisenstadt was formally decided on equal protection grounds110 but 
characterized it as explicitly or implicitly grounded as well in due process 
principles.111 However, in most cases, the Court simply has cited Eisenstadt in 
support of either the general proposition that the Due Process Clause protects a 
right to privacy112 or for the more specific proposition that it protects a right  
to contraception.113 
In sum, two of the seven cases cited in support of the modern theory of 
recognizing and enforcing fundamental rights under the Due Process  
Clause—Skinner and Eisenstadt—are actually equal protection precedents and do 
not support the proposition set forth in cases such as Carey. Moreover, a third case 
cited in support of the modern theory of substantive due process—Loving—was 
itself based upon a multi-faceted reconstruction of Skinner, and it is likewise subject 
to the same taint. 
b. Lochner Re-Incarnated: The Meyer and Pierce Cases 
In Lochner v. New York,114 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected “liberty of contract,” leading the 
Court to declare that a state labor law limiting the number of hours per day and per 
week bakery employees could work impermissibly interfered with the liberty of 
employers and employees to contract with one another.115 Lochner was part of an 
important line of cases that struck down hundreds of federal and state laws in the 
early 20th century116 until the line of decisions was ultimately overruled.117 Not only 
was Lochner overruled, but as will be demonstrated in Part I.C.1, the now-repudiated 
Lochner line of cases were themselves a result of dramatic judicial reconstruction of 
 
109. See id. (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453–54). 
110. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 539  
U.S. 558, 565 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 
(1992); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1977). 
111. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565; Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; 
Carey, 431 U.S. at 687. 
112. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 114 n.6 (1996); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497  
U.S. 417, 434 (1990); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 
(1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983); Runyon  
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 16 (1974); United States 
v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973); United States 
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973). 
113. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186, 190 (1986); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385 (1978). 
114. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
115. See id. at 45–65. 
116. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
117. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 390–97 (1937). 
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earlier precedent. Thus, because of both Lochner’s shaky foundation and its ultimate 
overruling, precedents grounded in Lochner are on an unstable footing. Yet two of 
the key cases forming the basis of modern substantive due process  
jurisprudence—Meyer and Pierce—are direct outgrowths of Lochner. Moreover, two 
additional cases—Prince and Griswold—justified their holdings by reliance on 
judicial reconstructions of Meyer and Pierce and are thus subject to the same taint. 
In Meyer, the Court declared unconstitutional a Nebraska law that made it a 
crime to teach foreign languages to students who had not yet completed eighth 
grade.118 In Pierce, decided two years later, the Court struck down an Oregon law 
requiring children between the ages of 8 and 16 to attend public (as opposed to 
private) schools.119 The decisions, which were issued in the midst of the Lochner era 
and penned by Justice McReynolds—a staunch advocate of the view that the Due 
Process Clause protected “freedom of contract”120—appeared at the time to be 
primarily grounded in that theory. Meyer cited Lochner and a variety of other  
Lochner-era decisions and then spoke of the rights of the foreign-language teacher 
to sell his services and the parents to purchase them, concluding that “[h]is right 
thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we 
think, are within the liberty of the amendment.”121 And Pierce focused on the impact 
that the law would have on the private school litigants challenging the law, noting 
that its enforcement would “seriously impair, perhaps destroy, the profitable 
features of [their] business and greatly diminish the value of their property”122 and 
writing of the Due Process Clause “protect[ing] business enterprises against 
interference with the freedom of patrons or customers.”123 Thus, just as in Lochner, 
the Court’s focus was on the freedom of people to purchase and sell one another’s 
labor free of governmental interference. 
Yet both cases also had something in common with Skinner and Eisenstadt 
that made them prime targets for subsequent judicial reconstruction: broad dicta 
unnecessary to the decisions. In Skinner, it was a reference to marriage, while in 
Eisenstadt, it was a brief mention of the colorable claim that Griswold’s fundamental 
rights holding might extend to unmarried persons. In Meyer, the broad dicta 
involved the Court’s general discussion of the “liberty” guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause: 
[I]t denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of 
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of 
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, 
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
 
118. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). 
119. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
120. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 514–16 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
121. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399–400. 
122. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531. 
123. Id. at 536 (citations omitted). 
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essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.124 
And Pierce wrote more broadly that the laws at issue in both Meyer and Pierce 
“interfere[ ] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control.”125 This was not merely dicta but also 
dicta lacking any foundation in precedent: not one of the cases cited in Meyer made 
any reference—direct or indirect—to marriage, freedom of religion, or parental 
control over their children, and Pierce cited nothing but Meyer in support of its broad 
statement regarding parental control.126 
Because Lochner and its progeny were ultimately overruled, Meyer and Pierce 
could remain viable precedent only if they were severed from their roots in those 
decisions. The process of reconstructing Meyer and Pierce began as early as  
1938—one year after Lochner was overruled—and has continued into the present. 
Indeed, the Court’s short opinions in Meyer and Pierce hold the record for the 
number of times a decision has been judicially reconstructed. 
The first case to re-characterize the decisions was United States v. Carolene 
Products.127 Carolene Products was part of a series of decisions endorsing highly 
deferential rational basis review of equal protection challenges,128 a development 
parallel to the Court’s return to highly deferential rational basis review under the 
Due Process Clause in its retreat from Lochner the year before. At the same time, 
Carolene Products dropped a famous footnote indicating that the level of judicial 
scrutiny might be higher when, inter alia, a law targeted minority groups.129 In so 
holding, Carolene Products invoked both Meyer and Pierce. Specifically, the  
Court wrote: 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review 
of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, or 
national, Meyer v. Nebraska, or racial minorities; whether prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to 
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.130 
Carolene Products thus re-characterized Pierce and Meyer as equal protection 
(rather than due process) cases calling for heightened scrutiny where discrimination 
on the bases of religion and national origin are involved, despite the absence of any 
such characterization in the decisions themselves. 
Six years after issuing its opinion in Carolene Products, the Court once again  
 
124. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (citations omitted). 
125. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35. 
126. See id.; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
127. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
128. See id. at 151–54. 
129. See id. at 152 n.4. 
130. Id. 
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re-characterized Meyer and Pierce. At issue in Prince131 was the constitutionality of 
applying child labor laws to a Jehovah’s Witness who claimed that doing so violated 
her religious convictions.132 In the course of considering that claim, the  
Court—relying on the broad, unsupported dicta in Meyer and Pierce—characterized 
those decisions as together having “respected the private realm of family life which 
the state cannot enter.”133 
About two decades later, the Court in Griswold, for the third time,  
re-characterized the Meyer and Pierce decisions. The Griswold Court addressed the 
constitutionality of a law punishing people who used contraceptives and those who 
aided and abetted people in doing the same.134 Eschewing reliance on Lochner,135 
the Court plurality instead held that it was relying on the “penumbras” of the Bill 
of Rights that create a constitutionally protected zone of privacy.136 To support its 
conclusion, the plurality re-characterized Meyer and Pierce as incorporating and 
applying the penumbras of the First Amendment to the states: 
By Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the right to educate one’s children as one 
chooses is made applicable to the States by the force of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. By Meyer v. State of Nebraska, the same dignity 
is given the right to study the German language in a private school.137 
The Griswold plurality’s reconstruction of Meyer and Pierce was not only 
divorced from the actual holdings in those cases, but it was also inconsistent with 
the state of the law at the time of those decisions. For it was not until several decades 
after those cases were decided that the Court ultimately ruled that the First 
Amendment right was incorporated and applied against the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment.138 Thus, it is not surprising that the separate opinions in 
Griswold characterized the holdings in those cases differently. Justice Goldberg’s 
concurring opinion followed the Prince Court’s characterization of them as having 
“respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”139 Justice 
White’s concurring opinion relied on the broader language used in Meyer and Pierce, 
citing them for the specific propositions that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of liberty “includes the right ‘to marry, establish a home, and bring up 
children’” and the right “to direct the upbringing and education of children,” 
respectively.140 In contrast, Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion, characterized 
 
131. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
132. See id. at 159–64. 
133. Id. at 166. 
134. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
135. See id. at 481–82. 
136. See id. at 484. 
137. Id. at 482 (citations omitted). 
138. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 n.12 (2010) (citations omitted); see also 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting). 
139. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 158 (1944)). 
140. Id. at 502 (White, J., concurring) (first quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923); then quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)). 
First to Printer_Nicolas.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/30/20  4:13 PM 
958 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:937 
the cases as being Lochner-era decisions grounded in liberty of contract.141 
Given these various characterizations of the Meyer and Pierce decisions—which 
sometimes, as in Griswold, occur even within the same case—it is thus not surprising 
that subsequent decisions have cited the cases for a variety of different propositions. 
The Court’s decision in Roe described the pair of cases as recognizing that decisions 
by parents regarding “child rearing and education” are protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.142 The Court’s decisions in Loving, Zablocki, and  
Obergefell—recognizing a fundamental right to marry that includes, respectively, 
interracial marriage, marriage by those who have outstanding child support 
obligations, and same-sex marriage—each cited Meyer for the proposition that the 
right to “marry” is a fundamental one protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.143 
And the Court’s 2000 decision in Troxel v. Granville144 described them as standing 
for “the [liberty] interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of 
their children.”145 
In sum, although Meyer and Pierce are part and parcel of the now discredited 
Lochner line of cases, they have been divorced from their roots in those precedents 
as a result of multiple instances of re-characterization. They, along with Prince and 
Griswold—which themselves re-characterized Meyer and Pierce—as well as Skinner, 
Eisenstadt, and Loving, are consistently presented by the Court in support of the 
contemporary approach to recognizing and enforcing substantive fundamental 
rights under the Due Process Clause. Yet as shown above, upon closer scrutiny, 
none of these precedents actually stood for the proposition for which they are cited 
in contemporary decisions. 
2. Re-characterizing Level of Scrutiny: The Sex and Legitimacy Classification Cases 
For approximately the first one hundred years after the Reconstruction 
Amendments were ratified, the U.S. Supreme Court consistently upheld laws that 
drew sex-based distinctions, applying only highly deferential rational basis scrutiny 
to such laws when they were challenged on equal protection grounds.146 In 1971, 
the Court in Reed v. Reed147 for the first time declared unconstitutional on equal 
protection grounds a law that treated men and women differently. At issue in Reed 
was the constitutionality of an Idaho statute providing that when two people are 
otherwise equally entitled to appointment as the administrator of an estate, a male 
 
141. Id. at 514–16, 516 n.7 (Black, J., dissenting). 
142. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
143. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 
(1978); Loving, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). 
144. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
145. Id. at 65. 
146. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 69 (1961); Goesaert v. Clearly, 335 U.S. 464, 467 
(1948); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283–84 (1937); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59,  
63 (1912). 
147. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
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applicant must be preferred to a female one.148 Yet, Reed did not purport to apply 
anything higher than rational basis scrutiny, stating that the relevant test was 
whether the classification at issue “bears a rational relationship to a state 
objective”149 and concluding that the law at issue failed that test.150 
Two years later, a plurality of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson151  
re-characterized Reed as having applied heightened equal protection scrutiny by 
focusing on what Reed did rather than what it explicitly held. Frontiero noted that the 
party defending the Idaho statute’s constitutionality in Reed sought to rationalize in 
its brief before the Court the sex-based distinction in the law on the ground that 
“men [are] as a rule are more conversant in business affairs than . . . women,” a basis 
similar to that upon which the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the statute’s 
constitutionality.152 The Frontiero plurality described Reed as having “implicitly 
rejected appellee’s apparently rational explanation of the statutory scheme,”153 
which the plurality described as a “departure from ‘traditional’ rational-basis 
analysis,”154 and concluded that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard for  
sex-based classifications.155 Yet, just three years later, a majority of the Court in 
Craig v. Boren156 announced a new standard for assessing sex-based equal protection 
challenges and, in so doing, again re-characterized Reed. The Craig Court declared 
that “previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives” and cited Reed as an example, among others, of such a case.157 This is so 
despite the fact that neither Reed nor any other case used any such language, leading 
the dissent to state that the newly announced intermediate scrutiny test “apparently 
comes out of thin air” and to note that “none of our previous cases adopt  
that standard.”158 
In the decades following Craig, the Court’s sex-based equal protection 
jurisprudence has undergone a tug-of-war between shifting majorities, with the 
decisions at times pulling the standard in the direction of either strict or rational 
basis scrutiny. In Craig itself, for example, Justice Powell characterized the standard 
differently, writing that “the relatively deferential ‘rational basis’ standard of review 
normally applied takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-based 
classification.”159 A few years after Craig was decided, the Court in Personnel 
 
148. Id. at 72–73. 
149. Id. at 76. 
150. Id. at 76–77. 
151. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
152. Id. at 683 (footnote omitted). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 684. 
155. Id. at 688. 
156. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
157. Id. at 197–98 (citations omitted). 
158. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
159. Id. at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). 
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Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney160 wrote after citing the intermediate scrutiny 
test announced in Craig that any law preferring males over females would thus 
require an “exceedingly persuasive justification.”161 In context and as subsequently 
noted by Chief Justice Rehnquist, this phrase was used “as an observation on the 
difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself.”162 
Yet soon after Feeney was decided, the Court, through the process of judicial 
reconstruction by means of selective quotation (examined above in Part I.A), 
attributed greater significance to this phrase, with majority opinions suggesting that 
a standard higher than intermediate scrutiny might be applicable to sex-based 
classifications. Thus, in both Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan163 and United 
States v. Virginia,164 the majority opinions included that phrase as part of the test 
itself, indicated that the language required the government to show “at least” that 
the classification served important governmental objectives and that the means 
employed are substantially related to achieving those objectives, and left open the 
question whether such classifications should instead be subject to strict scrutiny.165 
Indeed, so exacting was the scrutiny applied by the majority in Virginia itself that 
the dissent accused the majority of de facto applying strict scrutiny.166 Although  
post-Virginia a Court majority appeared to apply a more relaxed form of review 
than was employed in Virginia,167 it has since applied a heightened standard 
consistent with that employed in Virginia.168 
The Court followed a similar process with its cases involving classifications 
based on legitimacy. When the Court initially struck down laws discriminating 
against those born out of wedlock, it purported to apply nothing stronger than 
rational basis review.169 Because the Court purported to apply only rational basis 
review, during this initial period, the Court would at times uphold laws 
discriminating on this basis that were justified by tenuous rationales.170 The Court 
subsequently indicated that the standard of constitutional scrutiny for laws 
discriminating on the basis of legitimacy was not a “toothless one”171 and 
occasionally incorporated some intermediate scrutiny lingo when applying the 
 
160. Adm’r of Mass.v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
161. Id. at 273. 
162. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 559 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
163. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
164. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515. 
165. Id. at 532–33, 532 n.6 (citations omitted); Hogen, 458 U.S. at 723–24, 724 n.9  
(citations omitted). 
166. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 570–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
167. Compare Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 60–71 (2001), with 
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 574–94 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
168. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689–90 (2017). 
169. See  Weber  v.  Aetna  Cas.  &  Ins.  Co.,  406  U.S.  164,  172  (1972);  Glona  
v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). 
170. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536 n.6 (1971). 
171. Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1977). 
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standard.172 Subsequently, just as the Court did with sex discrimination in Craig, the 
Court in Clark v. Jeter173 ultimately re-characterized these earlier cases as in fact 
applying intermediate scrutiny.174 
These two lines of cases contained key elements that made them ripe for 
subsequent judicial reconstruction. In both lines of cases, the cases, like the Court’s 
decision in Eisenstadt, explicitly used rational basis lingo and purported to apply 
nothing more than rational basis scrutiny. Yet because the decisions in one or more 
ways departed from the deferential approach associated with rational basis review, 
one can re-cast them as in fact applying some higher level of scrutiny if one focuses 
on what the cases did rather than what they actually said. Indeed, a Justice bent on 
changing the level of scrutiny associated with a particular type of classification (but 
who lacks the votes to do so) could plant the seeds for later re-characterization by 
drafting an opinion that in form purports to apply one level of scrutiny but that in 
practice applies a different level of scrutiny. Later, when the Court’s composition 
changes, that opinion can be cited for its substance rather than its form, allowing 
the Court to appear as though it is merely following rather than  
overruling precedent. 
3. Re-characterizing Parameters of Constitutional Doctrine: The Reordering of the Political 
Process Doctrine 
What has been referred to as the Court’s “restructuring”175 or “reordering”176 
of the political process doctrine has changed significantly over time as the Court 
has engaged more than once in the process of re-characterizing its precedents in an 
effort to either narrow or broaden the doctrine’s scope. 
The first significant case in this line of cases does not mention any such 
doctrine. In Reitman v. Mulkey,177 the Court addressed the constitutionality of an 
amendment to California’s constitution that was enacted directly by voters in that 
state as a response to laws enacted by the state legislature that prohibited private 
discrimination in the sale or lease of residential housing.178 The challenge was 
brought under the Equal Protection Clause, alleging that the enactment of the 
constitutional amendment and its concomitant invalidation of state laws prohibiting 
private race-based discrimination in the sale or rental of residential housing 
constituted racial discrimination that violated the Equal Protection Clause.179 
Making out a claim that the constitutional amendment involved the state in  
 
172. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982). 
173. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988). 
174. See id. (first citing Mills, 456 U.S. at 99; then citing Matthews, 427 U.S. at 505–06). 
175. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 
U.S. 457, 485–86 n.29 (1982). 
176. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 336 (2014) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 357, 364–65 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Washington, 458 U.S. at 479. 
177. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
178. Id. at 370–75. 
179. Id. at 370–81. 
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race-based discrimination presented a challenge because in terms the amendment 
was race-neutral, providing as follows: 
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or 
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or 
desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to 
sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his 
absolute discretion, chooses.180 
Thus, while it was true that the effect of the state constitutional amendment 
was to repeal (and prevent the re-enactment of) laws prohibiting race-based 
discrimination in the sale or lease of residential property, the amendment was more 
general in nature and likewise prevented the enactment of a variety of  
non-race-based laws regulating the sale or lease of real property. 
Nonetheless, Reitman invalidated the amendment, deeming it to be race-based 
discrimination by the state in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court 
acknowledged that “mere repeal” of a law prohibiting racial discrimination would 
not, standing alone, violate the Equal Protection Clause.181 However, deferring to 
findings made by the California Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded 
that the amendment was unconstitutional because instead of taking a neutral 
position on the question of racial discrimination, the law was designed to actively 
encourage such acts of private racial discrimination.182 This finding that the 
amendment was tacitly designed to encourage private racial discrimination was 
critical to the Court’s decision. Under longstanding precedent, the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are applicable only to action attributable to the 
government; purely private conduct is outside the Amendment’s scope.183 Thus, the 
private acts of racial discrimination by those selling or leasing real property, standing 
alone, could not constitute an Equal Protection claim. However, pre-Reitman cases 
made clear that governmental action designed to encourage private racial 
discrimination could be challenged on equal protection grounds.184 Reitman relied 
on those precedents, coupled with the finding that such encouragement was at play 
in the case, to conclude that the state constitutional amendment was invalid.185 
Two years later, in Hunter v. Erickson,186 the Court began to sketch out what 
would become the reordering of the political process doctrine. In Hunter, an 
African-American woman brought a complaint to the City of Akron’s Commission 
on Equal Opportunity in Housing, alleging that a real estate agent refused to show 
her houses because of her race and seeking enforcement of the city’s fair housing 
 
180. Id. at 371 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26). 
181. Id. at 376–77. 
182. Id. at 374–81. 
183. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621–23 (2000); The Civil Rights Cases, 109  
U.S. 3, 10–14 (1883). 
184. See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964). 
185. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374–81. 
186. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
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ordinance.187 The Commission replied that she was no longer protected by the city’s 
fair housing ordinance because voters had amended the city’s charter to provide 
that no existing or future law regulating real property transactions on the basis of, 
inter alia, race was effective unless first approved by the city’s voters.188 The 
aggrieved woman brought a lawsuit against the City of Akron, seeking a declaration 
that the charter amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause. In the lower 
courts189 and in her brief filed in the U.S. Supreme Court,190 her attorneys argued 
that the charter amendment was analogous to the state constitutional amendment 
at issue in Reitman and should likewise be struck down, focusing on the 
comparatively greater burden that racial minorities faced in re-enacting such laws. 
The Court agreed that the charter amendment was unconstitutional.191 
However, in responding to the City’s claim that Reitman was distinguishable, the 
Court said that it need not rely on Reitman’s finding of a discriminatory purpose 
underlying a facially neutral constitutional amendment because the charter 
amendment at issue in Hunter was not facially neutral; it treated racial housing 
matters differently from other racial and housing matters.192 According to the 
Hunter majority and the concurring opinion, the constitutional problem with the 
city charter amendment was that it made it comparatively more difficult for those 
seeking to advance housing laws targeting racial discrimination.193 After the city 
charter amendment was passed, future laws addressing most housing matters would 
go into effect upon approval by the City Council, but those involving racial housing 
matters had to undergo the additional step of getting voter approval before taking 
effect.194 Moreover, even though the charter amendment applied with equal force 
to laws that would protect white people from racial discrimination, the Court 
reasoned that the law was still not racially neutral: 
[A]lthough the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in 
an identical manner, the reality is that the law’s impact falls on the minority. 
The majority needs no protection against discrimination and if it did, a 
referendum might be bothersome but no more than that . . . . [The charter 
amendment] places special burdens on racial minorities within the 
governmental process.195 
The third key case in this line of decisions was the Court’s 1982 decision in 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.196 At issue in Seattle was the 
 
187. Id. at 387. 
188. Id. 
189. See State ex rel. Hunter v. Erickson, 233 N.E.2d 129, 131 (Ohio 1967). 
190. See Brief for Appellant, Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (No. 63), 1968 WL 
1125644, at *20–24. 
191. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392–93. 
192. Id. at 393. 
193. See id. at 390–93; id. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
194. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390. 
195. Id. at 391. 
196. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
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constitutionality of a Washington State citizen initiative that the state’s voters 
approved in response to the City of Seattle’s racially integrative school busing 
plan.197 Like the constitutional amendment struck down in Reitman, the initiative in 
Seattle was facially race-neutral, providing that “no school board . . . shall directly or 
indirectly require any student to attend a school other than the school which is 
geographically nearest or next nearest the student’s place of residence . . . and which 
offers the course of study pursued by such student.”198 The initiative contained a 
laundry list of exceptions, however, that largely left local school boards free to  
re-assign students for virtually any purpose other than voluntary (i.e., non-court 
mandated) racial integration.199 
Relying almost exclusively on Hunter—without any mention of  
Reitman—Seattle declared the state initiative unconstitutional on equal protection 
grounds. Seattle first brushed aside an effort to distinguish Hunter on the ground 
that the city charter amendment in Hunter was facially discriminatory on race while 
the Washington initiative was race neutral. Citing the structure of the initiative and 
the context of the political campaign to approve it, the Court concluded that the 
initiative was race-based action for equal protection purposes because it was clearly 
motivated by the effect it would have on racially integrative busing.200 Moreover, 
the Court rejected the argument that it was race neutral because it impacted people 
of all races, noting that “desegregation of the public schools, like the Akron open 
housing ordinance, at bottom inures primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is 
designed for that purpose.”201 It then concluded that the constitutional infirmity 
was the same in both cases: the power to address discrete minority interests was 
placed at a different level of government where it was harder to achieve success.202 
According to Seattle, this “comparative structural burden placed on the political 
achievement of minority interests” rendered the initiative unconstitutional.203 
Although these three cases have much in common with one another, the 
decisions remained at the time of Seattle only loosely tied together. Hunter made only 
a brief reference to Reitman, and Seattle made no mention of Reitman at all. This is 
likely because in Reitman itself the Court was focused on the substantive equal 
protection problem present in the case—the fact that the state was allegedly 
encouraging private racial discrimination. Yet, also present, but not articulated, in 
Reitman was the same procedural equal protection problem found in Hunter and 
Seattle: racial minorities seeking to enact antidiscrimination laws now faced a 
“comparative structural burden” because a constitutional amendment repealed and 
prohibited the re-enactment of such laws. Of course, in hindsight, despite Reitman’s 
 
197. See id. at 461–64. 
198. Id. at 462 (quoting Washington Initiative 350). 
199. See id. at 462–63. 
200. See id. at 471. 
201. Id. at 472. 
202. Id. at 474, 483. 
203. See id. at 474 n.17. 
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formal holding, the case could be judicially reconstructed as a case about 
comparative structural burdens, which would put it on all fours with Hunter  
and Seattle. 
Not until the Court’s 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans204 did a majority of the 
Court—in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy—tie the three cases together, 
referring to them as “our precedents involving discriminatory restructuring of 
governmental decisionmaking.”205 In Romer, the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of a Colorado constitutional amendment that repealed state and 
local laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
prohibited the subsequent enactment of such laws at either the state or local 
levels.206 Although the lower court relied on the Court’s reordering of the political 
process cases, the Romer Court instead held that the law was unconstitutional for a 
different reason, namely because it was not rationally related to furthering any 
legitimate governmental interest.207 While Romer’s discussion of this line of cases is 
limited and unnecessary to the Court’s decision, it did arguably reconstruct Reitman 
as being a case about erecting comparative structural burdens for the enactment of 
laws benefiting racial minorities. 
The Court’s most recent decision in this line of cases—Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action208—provides a much starker example of  
re-characterization. In Schuette, the Court assessed the constitutionality of Proposal 
2, a voter-approved amendment to Michigan’s constitution that prohibited  
race-conscious preferences in admissions at the state’s public colleges and 
universities.209 The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, engaged in a seemingly 
straightforward application of Hunter and Washington to declare Proposal 2 
unconstitutional.210 Just like antidiscrimination laws in Hunter and racially 
integrative busing in Seattle, the Sixth Circuit concluded that race-conscious 
admissions programs inure primarily to the benefit of the minority.211 Moreover, 
just as in those two cases, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Proposal 2 placed a 
comparative structural burden on minorities seeking to enact race-conscious 
admissions programs since they could no longer seek redress at the university 
governing boards as others could for non-race based policies; they would instead 
have to first seek voter approval to reverse the constitutional amendment before 
getting race-conscious admissions policies enacted.212 
Given the Sixth Circuit’s seemingly textbook application of the Court’s 
political process doctrine, it appeared that the Court’s options were either to affirm 
 
204. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
205. Id. at 625. 
206. Id. at 624. 
207. Id. at 625–26, 635. 
208. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014). 
209. See id. at 298–99. 
210. See BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
211. See id. at 478–79. 
212. See id. at 483–85. 
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the lower court—as Justice Sotomayor argued for in dissent213—or to overrule the 
entire line of cases—as Justice Scalia argued for in a concurrence.214 Instead, Justice 
Kennedy’s plurality opinion proceeded to judicially reconstruct the entire line of 
cases in such a remarkable manner that the diametrically opposing opinions of 
Justices Sotomayor and Scalia agreed on one point: that the majority had 
reinterpreted the precedents “beyond recognition.”215 
Justice Kennedy began his reconstruction by subtly shifting his treatment of 
Reitman. Just as he did in his opinion in Romer, he identified Reitman as the 
“beginning point for discussing the controlling decisions” in this line of cases.216 
But unlike Romer, he no longer referred to the cases as precedents involving 
discriminatory restructuring of governmental decisionmaking. Instead, Justice 
Kennedy described the constitutional infirmity in Reitman as the state 
“encourage[ing] discrimination, causing real and specific injury.”217 This was, in fact, 
an accurate description of Reitman, and neither Justice Sotomayor nor Justice Scalia 
challenged it. However, Justice Kennedy then proceeded to reconstruct Hunter and 
Seattle to make it appear as though the constitutional problem in those cases was a 
similar substantive one of the government encouraging racial discrimination rather 
than the procedural problem of making it harder for racial minorities to enact 
legislation in their interest. 
Justice Kennedy first turned his attention to Hunter. According to Justice 
Kennedy, “[c]entral to the Court’s reasoning in Hunter was that the charter 
amendment was enacted in circumstances where widespread racial discrimination 
in the sale and rental of housing led to segregated housing, forcing many to live in 
“‘unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded conditions.’”218 He then tied 
Hunter back to Reitman, contending that in both cases “there was a demonstrated 
injury on the basis of race that, by reasons of state encouragement or participation, 
became more aggravated.”219 By tying Hunter and Reitman together in this manner, 
Kennedy suggested that they were both about the government encouraging private 
discrimination. However, in Hunter, the Court explicitly disclaimed any reliance on 
a finding that the City of Akron was encouraging racial discrimination and made 
clear that its holding was based on the procedural comparative structural burden: 
Akron argues that this case is unlike Reitman v. Mulkey in that here the city 
charter declares no right to discriminate in housing, authorizes and 
encourages no housing discrimination, and places no ban on the enactment 
of fair housing ordinances. But we need not rest on Reitman to decide this 
case. Here, unlike Reitman, there was an explicitly racial classification 
 
213. See Schuette, 572 U.S. at 357 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
214. See id. at 322 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
215. See  id.  at  320–21  (Scalia, J.,  concurring  in  the  judgment);  id.  at  360  (Sotomayor,  
J., dissenting). 
216. Id. at 302 (plurality opinion). 
217. Id. at 303. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 304. 
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treating racial housing matters differently from other racial and  
housing matters.220 
By failing to acknowledge this portion of Hunter, Justice Kennedy effectively 
re-wrote the opinion. 
Having judicially reconstructed Hunter to align it with Reitman’s substantive 
equal protection holding, Justice Kennedy proceeded to do the same with Seattle. 
According to Justice Kennedy, “Seattle is best understood as a case in which the 
state action in question . . . had the serious risk, if not purpose, of causing specific 
injuries on account of race, just as had been the case in [Reitman] and Hunter.”221 To 
support this remarkable reconstruction of Seattle, Justice Kennedy cited not to the 
opinion itself but instead to Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1222—a case decided twenty-five years after 
Seattle.223 According to Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer’s Parents Involved dissent 
showed that “school segregation in the district in the 1940’s and 1950’s may have 
been the partial result of school board policies.”224 Thus, Justice Kennedy reasoned, 
the Seattle Court likely viewed the school board’s desegregation program to be an 
appropriate remedy for de jure segregation.225 And given that the Seattle Court 
thought, or at least assumed, that Seattle had a history of de jure segregation, it 
supposedly “found that the State’s disapproval of the school board’s busing remedy 
was an aggravation of the very racial injury in which the State itself  
was complicit.”226 
Having thus constructed an alternative rationale for the Court’s opinion in 
Seattle, Justice Kennedy proceeded to treat Seattle’s actual holding as dictum. 
Specifically, he wrote: 
The broad language used in Seattle, however, went well beyond the analysis 
needed to resolve the case . . . . In essence, according to the broad reading 
of Seattle, any state action with a “racial focus” that makes it “more difficult 
for certain racial minorities than for other groups” to “achieve legislation 
that is in their interest” is subject to strict scrutiny. It is this reading of 
Seattle that the Court of Appeals found to be controlling here. And that 
reading must be rejected.227 
Justice Kennedy concluded by providing a new description of the  
Reitman-Hunter-Seattle line of cases. According to his opinion, “[t]hose cases were 
ones in which the political restriction in question was designed to be used, or was 
 
220. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 389 (1969). 
221. Schuette, 572 U.S. at 305. 
222. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
223. Schuette, 572 U.S. at 305 (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 807–08 (Breyer,  
J., dissenting)). 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 306. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 306–07. 
First to Printer_Nicolas.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/30/20  4:13 PM 
968 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:937 
likely to be used, to encourage infliction of injury by reason of race.”228 
Justices Scalia and Sotomayor, while disagreeing on how the case should be 
resolved, on multiple occasions called out what they viewed as Justice Kennedy’s 
egregious re-characterization of Hunter and Seattle. For example, Justice Scalia 
described the plurality’s description of the holding in Seattle as “what our opinion 
in Seattle might have been, but assuredly not what it was.”229 Similarly, Justice 
Sotomayor remarked that “the plurality might prefer that the Seattle Court had said 
that, but it plainly did not,”230 and that “[w]e ordinarily understand our precedents 
to mean what they actually say, not what we later think they could or should have 
said.”231 Indeed, in a passage of her dissent that resonates with the thesis of this 
Article, Justice Sotomayor explained how the plurality’s effort at stealth 
reconstruction of earlier precedent undermines the principle of stare decisis: 
The plurality’s attempt to rewrite Hunter and Seattle so as to cast aside the 
political-process doctrine sub silentio is impermissible as a matter of stare 
decisis. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we usually stand by our decisions, 
even if we disagree with them, because people rely on what we say, and 
they believe they can take us at our word.232 
C. Citing “Dissenting Concurrences” 
Part I.A of this Article described how Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence 
reconstructed the meaning of an earlier precedent, Lewis, by stripping seemingly 
supportive language from its context and quoting that language in a way that gave 
it a rather different meaning. Yet Justice Kennedy’s treatment of Lewis was 
remarkable for a second reason: he was not even quoting from the majority opinion. 
Rather, he was quoting a concurring opinion, one authored by Justice Kennedy 
himself and joined by only one other Justice. 
Reliance on concurring rather than majority opinions in earlier cases 
represents a third method of reconstructing precedent. In some instances, a Justice 
in an earlier decision disagrees, sometimes strongly, with one or more aspects of the 
Court’s majority opinion. Indeed, the disagreement is sometimes so strong that it 
would be most appropriate for the Justice to pen a dissenting opinion. However, by 
denominating her opinion as a concurring one, the Justice is able to plant the seeds 
for effectively overturning the decision while appearing to follow it in a subsequent 
case. In some instances, the latter step is undertaken years or decades later by 
another Justice. But in other instances, a dramatic shift in the Court’s composition 
allows the same Justice who wrote a dissenting concurrence to effectuate 
reconstruction of the earlier decision. While there are many examples of this 
phenomenon, two rather significant cases involving substantive due process stand 
 
228. Id. at 313–14. 
229. Id. at 321 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
230. Id. at 359 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
231. Id. at 358. 
232. Id. at 360. 
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out: the Court’s recognition of a right to “liberty of contract” in Lochner v. New 
York,233 and the introduction of the “undue burden” standard for assessing the 
constitutionality of laws restricting abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.234 
1. Lochner and “Liberty of Contract” 
As noted above, in Lochner, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the theory that 
the Due Process Clause protected “liberty of contract.”235 This theory led the Court 
during the early twentieth century to strike down hundreds of federal and state 
laws236 until the line of decisions was ultimately overruled.237 Ironically, this  
now-repudiated line of cases came into being through a remarkable process of 
judicial reconstruction of the Court’s earlier precedents—which had in clear and 
unmistakable terms rejected the Lochner Court’s interpretation of the Due Process 
Clause—through the use of a dissenting concurrence penned in a pre-Lochner case. 
Shortly after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme 
Court had its first opportunity in The Slaughter-House Cases238 to interpret many of 
its clauses. In Slaughter-House, the Court rejected arguments made by an association 
of butchers that a state law that gave a private corporation a monopoly over 
livestock landing and slaughterhouse operations in New Orleans violated, inter alia, 
the Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, broadly rejecting the Court’s 
authority to recognize and enforce unenumerated rights under either provision.239 
In contrast, Justice Bradley’s dissenting opinion contended that both clauses protect 
the individual right to pursue common occupations of life and that the law at issue 
infringed upon that right.240 
Soon after the Court’s decision in Slaughter-House, Louisiana adopted a new 
constitution that, among other things, extinguished the monopoly powers over 
livestock landing and slaughterhouse operations that were at issue in that case.241 
Litigation over the monopoly powers returned to the Court once again, but this 
time with the private corporation asserting that the constitutional provision 
extinguishing its contractually granted monopoly rights violated the Contracts 
Clause242 of the U.S. Constitution.243 Writing for the majority in Butchers’ Union 
 
233. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
234. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
235. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45–65. 
236. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2617 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
237. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). 
238. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
239. See generally id. at 57–80. 
240. See id. at 122–23 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
241. See Butchers’ Union Slaughter-house and Live-stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City  
Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-house Co., 111 U.S. 746, 746–48 (1884). 
242. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
243. See Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 749. 
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Slaughterhouse Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing Co.,244 Justice Miller rejected 
the Contracts Clause claim.245 
Justice Bradley filed a concurring opinion that he acknowledged was for 
reasons “different from those stated in the opinion of the court.”246 Rather than 
addressing the Contracts Clause claim, Justice Bradley renewed his contention from 
his Slaughter-House dissent that the monopoly was void because it interfered with 
the right to pursue common occupations of life protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and indeed cited directly to his dissenting opinion in that  
earlier case.247 
After Butchers’ Union, the dissenting views in Slaughter-House had now made 
their way into a concurring opinion in a subsequent case, giving them an aura of 
legal authoritativeness despite the fact that in substance they represented a 
dissenting viewpoint. This paved the way for the Court in a series of cases to convert 
Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion into binding precedent. 
Thirteen years after Butchers’ Union was decided and several years after Justice 
Bradley retired, the Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana248 considered the constitutionality 
of a Louisiana law that restricted out-of-state companies from insuring property 
within the state. The Allgeyer Court declared the law unconstitutional, concluding 
that it deprived the insurers of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause: 
[T]he term [due process] is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to 
be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all 
lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any 
lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose 
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to 
his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes  
above mentioned.249 
In support of this broad proposition—which was at odds with the Court’s 
earlier decision in Slaughter-House—the Allgeyer Court cited none other than Justice 
Bradley’s concurring opinion in Butchers’ Union.250 
As a result of this multi-step process of reconstructing precedent, the 
dissenting views in Slaughter-House had made their way into a majority opinion. 
Thus, eight years later, when the Court issued its opinion in Lochner, it was able to 
briefly and confidently cite the majority opinion in Allgeyer—and solely that 
opinion—for the proposition that “[t]he general right to make a contract in relation 
to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th 
 
244. Id. 
245. See id. at 749–54. 
246. See id. at 760 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
247. See id. at 761–65. 
248. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
249. See id. at 589. 
250. See Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589 (citing Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 762, 764, 765 (Bradley,  
J., concurring)). 
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Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”251 From that point onward, the Court 
could cite primarily to Lochner for that general proposition. In effect, through the 
use of a dissenting concurrence, Justice Bradley’s dissenting views in Slaughter-House 
had been laundered through Butchers’ Union, Allgeyer, and Lochner so as to become 
controlling constitutional law. 
2. Casey and the “Undue Burden” Test 
As demonstrated in Part I.B.1, the Court’s decisions recognizing a right to 
procure an abortion under the Due Process Clause—including Roe—are premised, 
in part, on judicial reconstruction of the Court’s earlier decisions. Be that as it may, 
in recognizing the abortion right, Roe clearly and explicitly described the right as 
fundamental and subjected restrictions on that right to strict scrutiny review.252 Yet 
less than two decades after Roe, a plurality of the Court in Casey—while taking great 
pains to make clear that as a matter of stare decisis it would not overturn  
Roe—replaced the strict scrutiny standard with a far less exacting “undue  
burden” standard.253 
Although references in abortion cases to “undue burdens” appeared as early 
as Roe itself, the Court did not initially use them as a distinct test for assessing the 
constitutionality of abortion restrictions. Instead, those references were merely a 
way for Justices to describe the degree to which specific abortion restrictions 
burdened the rights of those seeking to procure an abortion. For example, in Roe 
and its companion case, Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate concurrence in which 
he indicated that he would be inclined to uphold a particular aspect of Texas’s 
abortion law because he did not view the required procedure as “unduly 
burdensome.”254 A few years later in Bellotti v. Baird,255 the author of Roe wrote an 
opinion indicating that a parental consent provision would raise constitutional 
concerns only if it “unduly burden[ed]” the minor’s right to procure an abortion.256 
References to challenged laws not being constitutional where they do not unduly 
burden the abortion right also appeared in two cases challenging laws prohibiting 
the funding of abortions, Maher v. Roe257 and Harris v. McRae,258 although in both 
cases even that reference was largely irrelevant because the Court made clear that 
the Due Process Clause was not even properly implicated in the cases.259 
A decade after Roe was decided, the Court in City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
 
251. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (citing Allgeyer, 165 U.S. 578). 
252. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56, 162–64 (1973). 
253. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,  
874–79 (1992). 
254. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973) (Burger, J., concurring). 
255. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
256. See id at 145–48. 
257. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977). 
258. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980). 
259. Id. at 317–18. 
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Reproductive Health, Inc.260 reiterated that Roe required strict scrutiny of laws 
restricting the abortion right and applied that standard to strike down most portions 
of a city ordinance restricting abortion.261 This generated a dissent by Justice 
O’Connor, who instead contended that the “undue burden” standard was the 
appropriate one for assessing restrictions on the abortion right.262 According to 
Justice O’Connor, under this standard, the Court was first to determine whether 
the law at issue placed an “undue burden” on the abortion right.263 If not, the law 
would be sustained so long as it passed rational basis review.264 In support of this 
conclusion, she cited Bellotti, Maher, and Harris,265 all of which used the phrase in 
the informal way described above and none of which suggested that rational basis 
review would apply if the burden was not deemed undue. 
The very same day that City of Akron was decided, the Court issued opinions 
in two other cases—Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft266 
and Simopoulos v. Virginia267—regarding the constitutionality of abortion 
restrictions. Unlike City of Akron, which struck down all of the challenged 
provisions, in these two cases, the Court upheld some or all of the challenged 
statutes.268 Justice O’Connor wrote concurring opinions in these two cases, agreeing 
with the result but contending that the undue burden standard applied.269 Justice 
O’Connor was thus able to almost immediately include what was in substance a 
dissenting view into a pair of dissenting concurrences. In the decade that followed, 
Justice O’Connor reiterated in concurring opinions in Hodgson v. Minnesota270 and 
Webster v. Reproductive Services271 and in a dissenting opinion in Thornburgh  
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists272 that the undue burden standard 
applied when assessing restrictions on abortion. 
This series of separate opinions laid the foundation for the Court’s 1992 
decision in Casey. There, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter penned the 
controlling “joint opinion” for the Court, which reaffirmed what it described as 
 
260. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
261. See id. at 427. 
262. See id. at 453, 461–66 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
263. See id. at 453. 
264. See id. 
265. See id. at 453, 461 n.8. 
266. Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). 
267. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983). 
268. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 494; Simopoulos, 462 U.S. at 518–19. 
269. See Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 505 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part in the judgment and 
dissenting in part); Simopoulos, 462 U.S. at 519–20 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
270. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 459 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment in part). 
271. Webster v. Reprod. Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 529–30 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
272. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. Of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828–29 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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“Roe’s essential holding”273 but replaced Roe’s strict scrutiny standard with the 
“undue burden” standard.274 In support of its conclusion that the “undue burden” 
standard was the appropriate one, the opinion cited Bellotti, Maher, and Harris, as 
well as Justice O’Connor’s separate opinions in Hodgson, Webster, Thornburgh, City 
of Akron, Ashcroft, and Simopoulos.275 Justice O’Connor was thus able to make it 
appear in Casey’s joint opinion as though the undue burden standard was firmly 
established even though the cited cases were mostly dissenting concurrences written 
by Justice O’Connor herself—often joined by no other Justice—or were majority 
opinions that used the phrase in an informal way to describe the degree of burden 
on the abortion right in the cases before the Court. 
The joint opinion in Casey was criticized by a majority of the Justices, liberal 
and conservative alike. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and three other 
Justices, described it as “created largely out of whole cloth by the authors of the 
joint opinion,” noted that it “does not command the support of a majority of this 
Court,” and advocated instead for overruling Roe and applying no more than 
rational basis review to laws restricting abortion.276 Justice Blackmun agreed with 
this characterization and advocated instead for the application of strict scrutiny.277 
Ultimately, the “undue burden” standard was ratified by a majority of the 
Court in Stenberg v. Carhart278 with a simple citation of Casey,279 effectively 
laundering Justice O’Connor’s dissenting views into a solid majority opinion. 
II. JUDICIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
As demonstrated in Part I, the Court has employed a variety of different 
methods for reconstructing its precedents interpreting the Reconstruction 
Amendments. These same methods can and have been used to reconstruct 
precedents addressing other provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Although an 
exhaustive examination of every Court decision engaging in judicial reconstruction 
of precedent is beyond the scope of this Article, this section provides two examples 
of such cases, both of which involve multiple reconstructions of earlier precedent. 
A. The Interstate Commerce Clause Cases 
One of Congress’s key enumerated powers is its power to regulate interstate 
commerce pursuant to the Commerce Clause.280 Indeed, when the Court in The 
 
273. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
274. See id. at 874. 
275. See id. at 874–75. 
276. See id. at 964, 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting  
in part). 
277. See id. at 930, 942 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part). 
278. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
279. See id. at 921. 
280. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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Civil Rights Cases declared that Congress lacked the power under the Thirteenth or 
Fourteenth Amendments to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1875, it hinted that such 
a law might be upheld if Congress enacted and justified the law on Commerce 
Clause grounds.281 Nearly 80 years later, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
similar federal statute prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations 
on Commerce Clause grounds.282 However, like the Court’s precedents interpreting 
the Reconstruction Amendments, the Court’s precedents governing the Commerce 
Clause power have likewise been the subject of extensive judicial reconstruction. 
The Court’s early cases interpreting the Commerce Clause power attempted 
to strictly demarcate what fell within and outside that power, with the line 
sometimes drawn between direct and indirect effects on commerce283 and at other 
times between harmful and harmless goods.284 But beginning in 1937, at the same 
time that the Court overruled its Lochner-era precedents, it also abandoned these 
various tests for assessing the constitutionality of congressional exercises of the 
Commerce Clause power and replaced them with one that required only that the 
regulated activity “substantially” effect commerce.285 This test was a highly 
deferential one, with the Court holding that it would give deference to a 
congressional finding that a regulated activity substantially effects interstate 
commerce so long as the finding was “rational.”286 Indeed, so deferential was the 
Court’s substantial effects test that even a seemingly isolated instance of commerce 
that was purely intrastate in character could be regulated by Congress when that 
activity—when combined with like conduct by others—effected interstate 
commerce.287 As a result, the only activities that were outside the reach of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power were those that were wholly engaged in 
intrastate and had no effects at all outside of the state.288 
In these cases, the Court clarified that Congress’s Commerce Clause power 
could be divided into three different categories: 
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems. 
First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which 
Congress deems are being misused, as, for example, the shipment of stolen 
goods . . . or of persons who have been kidnaped . . . . Second, protection 
of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as, for example, the 
destruction of an aircraft . . . or persons or things in commerce, as, for 
 
281. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 19–20 (1883). 
282. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 295 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,  
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 242–43 (1964). 
283. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546–50 (1935). 
284. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–72 (1918). 
285. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 
115–17 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1937). 
286. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981); 
Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303–04. 
287. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975). 
288. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302. 
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example, thefts from interstate shipments . . . . Third, those activities 
affecting commerce.289 
The first two categories are in some sense the core of the Commerce Clause 
power, and in listing these three subjects of regulation, the Court frequently 
emphasized that the Commerce Clause power was not limited to the first two but 
also included the third.290 Moreover, it is to this third category that the deferential 
“substantial effects” test was applied by the Court. 
For nearly sixty years, the Court followed this highly deferential test with 
respect to the third category and placed few limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power. However, in 1995, after the Court’s composition had shifted in a decidedly 
conservative direction, the Court issued an opinion in United States v. Lopez291 that 
drew a rigid line between what it characterized as “economic” and “non-economic” 
activity, with the Commerce Clause power interpreted to encompass only  
the former. 
At issue in Lopez was the constitutionality of a federal statute that made it a 
criminal offense to possess a firearm within a school zone.292 The Court began by 
identifying the three categories of activity that Congress can regulate pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause.293 Finding the first two categories inapplicable to the statute 
at issue, the Lopez Court turned its focus to the third category.294 It began by noting 
that its case law to date had not been entirely clear on what constitutes a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.295 However, the Court reviewed its cases upholding 
Congress’s exercise of Commerce Clause power based on substantial effects and 
concluded that all of them contained a common ingredient that the Court referred 
to alternatively as “economic” or “commercial” activity.296 It listed as examples its 
decisions upholding laws regulating coal mining; extortionate credit transactions; 
restaurants using substantial interstate supplies; inns and hotels catering to interstate 
guests; and production and consumption of homegrown wheat.297 The Court 
contrasted these with the law at issue—regulating the possession of a gun—which 
the Court concluded did not constitute economic or commercial activity.298 The 
Court also noted that in addition to not regulating commercial activity, the law was 
not “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
 
289. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); accord F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456  
U.S. 742, 754 n.18 (1982); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276–77. 
290. See F.E.R.C., 456 U.S. at 754 n.18; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276–77. 
291. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
292. See id. at 551–52. 
293. See id. at 558–59. 
294. See id. at 559. 
295. See id. 
296. See id. at 559–61. 
297. See id. at 559–60. 
298. See id. at 560–61. 
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regulated.”299 The Court thus held that the law could not be upheld under its 
decisions “upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with 
a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects 
interstate commerce.”300 
While the line that the Lopez Court sought to draw between commercial and 
non-commercial activity was a plausible way to distinguish Lopez from the Court’s 
earlier decision, the nature of the regulated activity was never a relevant 
consideration in the Court’s earlier decisions.301 In fact, those decisions had 
expressly stated that the plenary nature of Congress’s commerce power gave 
Congress the ability to regulate any type of activity so long as it substantially effected 
commerce.302 Thus, the Lopez Court—which made clear in its decision that it felt 
the need to constrain the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause  
power303—reconstructed its precedents in order to achieve its desired outcome. 
Five years later, the Court once again invoked the distinction between 
economic and non-economic activity as a basis for striking down a federal statute 
grounded in the Commerce Clause power. In United States v. Morrison,304 the Court 
addressed the constitutionality of a federal statute that provided a civil remedy for 
the victims of gender-motivated violence. The Court reasoned that, just like the 
possession of guns near schools, “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in 
any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”305 The Court cited Lopez for the 
proposition that its decisions to date have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of 
intrastate activity only when that activity is economic in nature.306 
Not only did the Lopez and Morrison Courts create a new distinction between 
economic and non-economic activity, but they also appeared to make arbitrary 
distinctions as to whether given activities counted as economic or non-economic. 
For example, it was unclear why possessing a gun near a school was not considered 
economic activity. Possession of a gun, after all, seems no less economic than the 
regulated activity of racial discrimination307 at issue in cases such as Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States308 or Katzenbach v. McClung.309 Perhaps the Court’s focus 
instead was on where the activity was occurring; thus, non-economic activity could 
be regulated if it occurred at an economic establishment.310 But if that is so, it is not 
 
299. See id. at 561. 
300. See id. 
301. See id. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
302. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 
124–25 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
303. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564–68. 
304. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
305. See id. at 613. 
306. See id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–60). 
307. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
308. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
309. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
310. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 625–27 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
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clear why a school is any less economic than the hotels and restaurants at issue in 
Heart of Atlanta or Katzenbach.311 
Indeed, because the line between economic and non-economic activity was 
non-existent prior to Lopez and Morrison and ill-defined in those cases, shifting 
majorities have been able to and likely in the future will further pivot this line of 
cases in one direction or the other by simply asserting that the regulated activity is 
or is not economic in nature. Thus, for example, in Gonzales v. Raich,312 the Court 
upheld a federal statute criminalizing the local cultivation and use of marijuana, 
deeming the targeted activity to be “quintessentially economic,”313 while the dissent 
viewed it as non-economic in nature.314 
B. The Presidential Removal Power Cases 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution provides in general terms that “[t]he 
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”315 
It provides the President with the power to appoint executive officers, but requires 
that such appointments receive the “advice and consent” of the U.S. Senate.316 
Furthermore, it empowers Congress to provide a different procedure for “inferior 
officers,” allowing it to vest the appointment power “as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”317 Finally, 
Article II provides that executive officers can be impeached by Congress for 
committing high crimes or misdemeanors.318 However, what Article II is silent on 
is the procedure for removing executive officers in the absence of an impeachable 
offense. Is this power vested in the President alone, or is the officer’s removal, like 
her appointment, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate or some other sort 
of check by Congress? 
In Myers v. United States,319 the Court engaged in an exhaustive historical 
analysis of these various provisions of Article II and issued a sweeping opinion 
holding that—save for the proviso for inferior officers—the power to remove 
executive officers is committed solely to the President. Myers involved an act that 
prevented the President from removing a postmaster without the advice and 
consent of the Senate.320 Despite this limit on his authority, Woodrow Wilson 
removed Frank S. Myers from his position as postmaster without obtaining the 
Senate’s consent.321 Myers brought suit, challenging his removal and demanding the 
 
311. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
312. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
313. See id. at 25. 
314. See id. at 49–50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
315. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
316. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
317. See id. 
318. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
319. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
320. See id. at 107. 
321. See id. at 106. 
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pay he would have received had he completed his four-year term.322 The 
government argued in response that the act’s limit on the President’s removal 
authority was unconstitutional.323 
After exhaustively surveying the history behind the enactment of Article II, 
the Myers Court identified three, sweeping principles regarding the President’s 
removal power: Article II’s vesting of “[t]he executive power” in the President 
coupled with the grant of power to appoint executive officers gives him the implied 
power to remove such executive officers;324 the Constitution’s only textual limit on 
the President’s removal authority is Congress’s power to vest the appointment of 
inferior officers in the courts or heads of departments, which simultaneously gives 
Congress the ability to vest the power to remove inferior officers in those same 
entities;325 and in all other instances, the President possesses an “unrestricted” 
removal power.326 
Applying these principles, the Court held that the act’s limit on the President’s 
ability to remove postmasters violated Article II.327 Furthermore, although not 
necessary to the decision, the Myers Court emphasized that its sweeping conclusions 
applied regardless of the nature of the removed officer’s functions. It provided as 
an example an executive officer who exercises quasi-judicial functions.328 
Less than a decade after the Myers decision, the question of presidential 
authority to remove executive officers returned once again to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States329 the Court reviewed President 
Roosevelt’s decision to remove one of his predecessor’s appointees from the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).330 The executor of the appointee’s estate 
brought a suit seeking to collect his unpaid salary, contending that a congressional 
act prevented the President from removing members of the FTC except for specific 
articulated causes.331 
Given Myers’ sweeping language, it would seem to follow logically that the 
Court in Humphrey’s Executor would uphold the President’s removal of the FTC 
appointee. Yet despite the Myer Court’s conclusion that the President’s removal 
power was “unrestricted,” the Humphrey’s Executor Court unanimously upheld the 
congressionally imposed limitation on the President’s power to remove members 
of the FTC. Dismissing much of Myers as dicta, the Humphrey’s Executor Court 
distinguished between executive officers who exercise “purely” executive powers 
and those who exercise quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power, limiting Myers to 
 
322. Id. 
323. See id. at 108. 
324. See id. at 115–19, 122, 126–27. 
325. See id. at 126–29. 
326. See id. at 130, 162, 172, 176. 
327. Id. at 176. 
328. See id. at 134–35. 
329. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
330. See id. at 618–19. 
331. See id. 
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only the former.332 Reasoning that the powers exercised by the FTC are partly  
quasi-legislative and partly quasi-judicial, the Court upheld Congress’s authority to 
limit the President’s ability to remove its members.333 
It is hard to discern whether Humphrey’s Executor overruled Myers, 
reconstructed it, or both. On the one hand, Humphrey’s Executor noted that Myers 
contained statements that tend to support the President’s position but indicated that 
such expressions were “disapproved” to the extent inconsistent with the opinion in 
Humphrey’s Executor.334 On the other hand, the decision did not purport to overrule 
Myers but only to ignore its dicta.335 But by introducing a new theory at odds with 
the reasoning in Myers, it appears as though Humphrey’s Executor viewed virtually 
everything in Myers as dicta save for its ultimate conclusion. The Humphrey’s 
Executor Court characterized that conclusion as “the narrow point actually decided” 
therein, namely, “that the President had power to remove a postmaster of the first 
class, without the advice and consent of the Senate as required by act of 
Congress.”336 In any event, whether Humphrey’s Executor reconstructed or overruled 
Myers, it is clear that the Court has sought in subsequent cases to reconstruct this 
entire line of precedent on more than one occasion. 
The next major case to address the President’s removal power was Wiener  
v. United States.337 At issue in Wiener was the President’s authority to remove a 
member of the War Claims Commission (WCC). While the Act of Congress creating 
the WCC gave the President the power to appoint its members with the advice and 
consent of the Senate and provided for a finite date when the WCC would be 
disbanded, it did not contain a provision for removing commissioners.338 After 
President Truman removed a commissioner, the commissioner filed suit seeking 
back pay for the remainder of the time he would have served on the WCC.339 
In resolving the dispute, Wiener embraced Humphrey’s Executor’s distinction 
between “purely executive officers” and those that exercised quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial powers. While acknowledging that Myers contained language 
indicating that the President had the power to remove executive officials who 
exercised quasi-judicial powers, the Wiener Court held that Humphrey’s Executor had 
modified this aspect of Myers.340 Because the Wiener Court concluded that the 
functions of the WCC were quasi-judicial in nature, it held that the President lacked 
the inherent constitutional authority to remove its commissioners.341 
 
332. See id. at 627–28. 
333. See id. at 628. 
334. See id. at 626. 
335. See id. at 626–27. 
336. Id. at 626. 
337. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
338. See id. at 349–50. 
339. See id. at 349–51. 
340. See id. at 352 (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628). 
341. See id. at 353–56. 
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Nearly three decades later, in Bowsher v. Synar,342 the Court once again revisited 
this line of cases. In Bowsher, the Court addressed the constitutionality of an act of 
Congress that attempted to assign executive powers to the Comptroller General, an 
official who was appointed by the President but could be removed only by an act 
of Congress.343 Relying on Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Wiener, the Bowsher 
Court declared this statutory scheme unconstitutional. 
While purporting to rely on past precedent, Bowsher subtly shifted that 
precedent by re-characterizing those cases as being concerned with congressional 
participation in the removal of an executive officer. Bowsher first wrote that Myers 
declared the statute at issue in that case unconstitutional on the ground that for 
Congress to “draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove or the 
right to participate in the exercise of that power . . . would be . . . to infringe the 
constitutional principle of the separation of governmental powers.”344 Next, it made 
brief mention of Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener, noting that the former 
“distinguished Myers, reaffirming its holding that congressional participation in the 
removal of executive officers is unconstitutional,” and observing that the latter 
“reached a similar result.”345 The Court then summarized the line of cases as 
standing for the proposition that “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of 
removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except  
by impeachment.”346 
Bowsher was followed two years later by Morrison v. Olson,347 which relied on 
the particular language used in Bowsher to further reconstruct this line of cases. In 
Morrison, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a federal statute that vested in 
a special division of Article III judges the power to appoint independent counsel 
and limited the Attorney General’s ability to remove such counsel, allowing removal 
only for conditions, such as physical or mental incapacity, that impair the counsel’s 
ability to carry out her duties.348 
The Morrison majority first concluded that the independent counsel was not a 
principal but rather an “inferior officer.”349 As Justice Scalia noted in dissent, the 
majority could have stopped at that finding and held that this fact alone gave 
Congress the power to restrict the removal of such an officer by the executive.350 
However, Morrison went further, providing a broad reconstruction of its decisions 
in Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Wiener, and Bowsher that replaced the line drawn 
between “purely executive officers” and those that exercised quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial powers with a completely different test for assessing restrictions on 
 
342. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
343. See id. at 717–21. 
344. See id. at 724 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926)). 
345. Id. at 724–25. 
346. Id. at 726. 
347. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
348. See id. at 661, 663. 
349. See id. at 670–73. 
350. See id. at 724 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the President’s removal power. 
As an initial matter, the majority declared the decisions in Myers and Bowsher 
wholly inapplicable to the case before the Court. Seizing on both the language in 
Bowsher that “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer 
charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment” and the language 
in Myers—as quoted in Bowsher—indicating that the Constitution prevents Congress 
from “draw[ing] to itself . . . the power to remove” executive officers, the Court 
noted that those precedents did not apply because here, unlike in those cases, 
Congress did not give itself the power to remove; it merely restricted the President’s 
flexibility to exercise the removal power.351 
Turning to Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener, the Morrison Court—while 
acknowledging that it “undoubtedly did rely on the terms ‘quasi-legislative’ and 
‘quasi-judicial’ to distinguish the officials involved in Humphrey’s Executor and 
Wiener from those in Myers”—diminished the importance of that language.352 The 
Morrison Court then re-characterized the Court’s removal cases as follows: 
The analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid 
categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the 
President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the 
President’s exercise of the “executive power” and his constitutionally 
appointed duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” under 
Article II.353 
The Morrison Court stated that “the real question is whether the removal 
restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform 
his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be 
analyzed in that light.”354 It then identified a number of factors that led the Court 
to conclude that the removal restrictions were constitutional, including the fact that 
the independent counsel was an inferior officer; that it had a limited jurisdiction and 
tenure; that it lacked policymaking or significant administrative authority; and that 
the executive retained the authority under the statutory scheme to ensure that the 
independent counsel was competently performing his abilities.355 
Justice Scalia penned a dissent in Morrison that both chastised the majority for 
reconstructing the Court’s precedents and also made note of the Court’s earlier 
reconstructions of this line of cases: 
Today, however, Humphrey’s Executor is swept into the dustbin of 
repudiated constitutional principles . . . . One can hardly grieve for the 
shoddy treatment given today to Humphrey’s Executor, which, after all, 
accorded the same indignity (with much less justification) to Chief Justice 
Taft’s opinion 10 years earlier in Myers v. United States . . . . It is in fact 
 
351. See id. at 685–86 (majority opinion) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)). 
352. See id. at 689. 
353. See id. at 689–90. 
354. Id. at 691. 
355. See id. at 691–93. 
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comforting to witness the reality that he who lives by the ipse dixit dies by 
the ipse dixit. But one must grieve for the Constitution.356 
The most recent case in this line of cases—Free Enterprise Fund  
v. PCAOB357—represents yet another reconstruction that retreats from the more 
fluid interpretation endorsed by the Morrison Court. Free Enterprise Fund addressed 
the constitutionality of what is known as a dual for-cause structure for removing 
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).358 Under 
the statute creating the Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
appoints five members to PCAOB who serve staggered, 5-year terms.359 Congress 
provided that members of the SEC could remove members of PCAOB only for 
good cause.360 In turn, members of the SEC pursuant to statute could likewise not 
be removed except for limited reasons.361 
The Free Enterprise Fund Court issued a bright-line opinion holding that such 
a dual for-cause structure violates Article II’s vesting of executive power in the 
President.362 Citing to the broader principles in Myers,363 the majority reasoned that 
this structure prevented the President from holding PCAOB accountable since he 
could neither directly remove members nor was there anyone directly responsible 
to the President who possessed that power.364 
In contrast, the Free Enterprise Fund dissent contended that the majority had 
ignored the test set forth in Morrison. First, the dissent described most of the Court’s 
decision in Myers—which the majority had relied upon—as having been “expressly 
disapproved” of in Humphrey’s Executor.365 Next, it cited Morrison for the 
proposition that the “essence” of Myers was that Congress could not aggrandize its 
power, a feature not present in the statute at issue.366 Third, it cited Morrison for the 
proposition that in lieu of bright line rules and categories, a fact-specific inquiry that 
looked at the impact of the law on the President’s exercise of executive power  
was required.367 
In sum, the Court’s removal power cases have shifted over the last century 
between bright-line rules and flexible standards and between broad and narrow 
protection of the President’s power to remove executive officials. Yet these 
dramatic shifts have occurred without the Court ever expressly overruling its earlier 
precedents, with the Justices in the shifting majorities instead opting to  
 
356. Id. at 725–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
357. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
358. See id. at 492. 
359. See id. at 484. 
360. See id. at 486–87. 
361. See id. at 487. 
362. See id. at 496. 
363. See id. at 492–93 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926)). 
364. See id. at 496–98. 
365. See id. at 518 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
366. See id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988)). 
367. See id. at 519–23 (citing Olson, 487 U.S. at 689–91). 
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re-characterize the Court’s earlier decisions. 
III. PRECEDENTS VULNERABLE TO RECONSTRUCTION 
As demonstrated above, the Court has demonstrated ingenuity in 
reconstructing its precedents interpreting not only the Reconstruction Amendments 
but also other constitutional provisions, allowing the Court to maintain formal 
fidelity to precedent while in practice subtly overruling it. If the Court continues to 
engage in this process, there are several lines of precedent that are ripe for such 
reconstruction if the Court’s composition moves more solidly in either a 
conservative or liberal direction. Two lines of precedents—the “gay rights” cases 
and the cases involving congressional power to “enforce” the Reconstruction 
Amendments—provide clear examples of the ways in which a future Court could 
reconstruct precedent. 
A. The “Gay Rights” Cases 
Between 1996 and 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued five opinions 
vindicating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of gay persons. First, in 1996, the 
Court in Romer v. Evans368 declared unconstitutional an amendment to Colorado’s 
constitution that repealed state and local laws prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation and prohibited the subsequent enactment of such laws 
at either the state or local levels. Next, in 2003, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas369 
struck down a Texas law criminalizing consensual same-sex sodomy. In 2013, the 
Court in U.S. v. Windsor370 declared unconstitutional a federal statute barring federal 
recognition of same-sex marriages lawfully entered into pursuant to state law. Then 
in 2015, the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges371 invalidated state laws prohibiting and 
refusing to recognize same-sex marriages. Finally, in 2017, the Court in Pavan  
v. Smith372 declared unconstitutional an Arkansas statutory scheme that 
automatically put a married woman’s husband’s name on the birth certificate if the 
woman gave birth to a child during their marriage but that would not put a married 
woman’s wife’s name on the birth certificate in that same circumstance. 
These five cases contain a number of elements in common with the cases 
examined in Parts I and II of this Article that make them vulnerable to various 
forms of reconstruction, both expansive and contractive. As a group, these cases 
are ambiguous on the level of scrutiny being applied and at times even the ground 
for the decision. Moreover, they were all decided by narrow 5-4 or 6-3 majorities, 
suggesting that modest shifts in the Court’s composition in one direction or the 
other may make them vulnerable to judicial reconstruction. 
 
368. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
369. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
370. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
371. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
372. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). 
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In Romer, the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause to strike down 
Colorado’s constitutional amendment but was somewhat ambiguous on the level of 
scrutiny that it applied. In terms, the Romer Court purported to apply mere rational 
basis review.373 But given how deferential that standard traditionally is,374 it seemed 
as though the Court in fact applied a more rigorous level of scrutiny, as some 
Justices acknowledged in separate opinions in both Romer itself and in subsequent 
cases.375 The Romer dissent seized on the majority’s language in an effort to cabin 
the future reach of the decision, dropping a footnote indicating that “[t]he Court 
evidently agrees that ‘rational basis’ . . . is the governing standard.”376 
In Lawrence, the Court’s opinion was ambiguous on both the basis for the 
decision and the level of scrutiny that it applied. With respect to the basis for the 
decision, the majority acknowledged the Equal Protection Clause as a viable ground 
for invalidating the sodomy statute but opted instead to rely on the Due Process 
Clause.377 However, the majority acknowledged a connection between the two 
clauses, declaring that “[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to demand 
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in 
important respects.”378 In addition, the Lawrence majority, while heavily relying on 
its fundamental rights cases379—suggesting that strict scrutiny or some other 
searching form of scrutiny was applicable—used the language of rational basis 
review, noting that the law at issue “furthers no legitimate state interest.”380 Just as 
in Romer, despite the language used by the Court, its actions suggested that 
something more searching than traditional rational basis review was in play. 
Moreover, just as in Romer, the dissent seized on this ambiguity in the Court’s 
opinion to cabin its reach, noting that the Court nowhere referred to sodomy as a 
fundamental right, nor did it claim to apply strict scrutiny but instead purported to 
apply only rational basis review.381 Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurrence 
in Lawrence, declining to join its due process holding but instead declaring the law 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.382 According to Justice O’Connor, 
Romer had applied a “more searching form of rational basis review,” which she 
deemed likewise applicable in Lawrence.383 Thus, collectively the Lawrence majority 
and concurring opinions contained ambiguities on both the constitutional basis for 
striking down the law as well as the level of scrutiny. 
 
373. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632–36. 
374. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 320 (1993); Williamson v. Lee Optical 
of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). 
375. See, e.g.,  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580  (2003)  (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Romer, 517 U.S. at 640–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
376. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
377. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–75. 
378. See id. at 575. 
379. See id. at 564–66, 573–74. 
380. See id. at 578. 
381. See id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
382. See id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
383. See id. at 579–80. 
First to Printer_Nicolas.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/30/20  4:13 PM 
2020] RECONSTRUCTION 985 
The next two cases, Windsor and Obergefell, together declared unconstitutional 
both federal and state laws denying recognition of and entry into same-sex 
marriages.384 Pavan then declared unconstitutional a state law that treated  
opposite-sex and same-sex couples differently so far as parentage rights tied to 
marriage are concerned.385 Like Romer and Lawrence, these cases are ambiguous on 
whether the basis for the decision is grounded in equal protection or due process, 
as well as the level of scrutiny being applied. Windsor cites both Romer and Lawrence 
and vacillates between discussing infringements on liberty and equal protection 
principles.386 And although the decision appears to apply something more rigorous 
than traditional rational basis scrutiny,387 it uses the language of rational basis in its 
analysis.388 In Obergefell, the Court explicitly cited both to due process389 and equal 
protection390 principles and cases, although there was some uncertainty as to 
whether its equal protection concerns were class-based (sexual orientation) or 
rights-based (marriage). Moreover, although the Court cited some of its 
fundamental rights cases, suggesting that strict scrutiny or some other form of 
heightened level of scrutiny was applicable,391 and the Court appeared to apply 
something more rigorous than traditional rational basis review,392 the Court never 
articulated a standard of review. Finally, Pavan was a short opinion that simply 
extended Obergefell, without discussing whether equal protection or due process 
principles were at play and without articulating a standard of review. 
Moving forward, this line of cases could easily be reconstructed in dramatically 
different ways. A liberal Court majority might re-characterize this entire line of cases 
as having applied intermediate or strict scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the 
basis of sexual orientation, in the same way that the Court previously  
re-characterized its sex and legitimacy lines of cases. Because nearly all of these cases 
referenced the Equal Protection Clause, the Court could treat the entire line of cases 
as sounding in equal protection. Moreover, because there were plausible rational 
bases for the challenged laws in each of these cases, often suggested by the dissents, 
the Court could cite those plausible rational bases as evidence that the Court had in 
fact been applying a higher level of scrutiny. 
If instead, as seems more likely in the near term, the Court were to turn in a 
more decisively conservative direction, it would be rather easy for a conservative 
majority to cabin the reach of these decisions so far as the rights of sexual minorities 
are concerned. The Court could cite the references to the lack of a “legitimate” 
 
384. See  Obergefell v. Hodges,  135 S. Ct. 2584,  2597–602  (2015);  United States v. Windsor, 
570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013). 
385. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078–79 (2017). 
386. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768–75. 
387. See id. at 793–94 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
388. See id. at 775 (noting that no “legitimate purpose” justifies the federal statute). 
389. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–602. 
390. See id. at 2602–05. 
391. See id. at 2597–602. 
392. See id. at 2623 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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governmental interest in support of a conclusion that only rational basis review 
applies to sexual orientation classifications. Moreover, the Court could cabin the 
reach of Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell, and Pavan by treating those cases as focused 
on the specific rights involved and not about classifications based on  
sexual orientation. 
In sum, because this line of cases is controversial and because the decisions 
contain ambiguous language regarding both the constitutional grounds at issue and 
the level of scrutiny applicable, they are ripe for judicial reconstruction should the 
Court’s composition shift decisively in one direction or the other. 
B. The Enforcement Power Cases 
Since the enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Court has been 
sharply divided on the authority each of those amendments grants Congress to 
“enforce” them.393 Cases interpreting Congress’s authority under these enforcement 
provisions have not only been the subject of multiple judicial reconstructions over 
the past 150 years but are vulnerable to further reconstruction by the Court, because 
of various ambiguities contained therein. 
The Court’s earliest decisions suggested that these enforcement provisions 
gave Congress no authority to proscribe conduct beyond that which the  
self-executing parts of these amendments already prohibited. Thus, for example, in 
The Civil Rights Cases,394 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected arguments that Congress 
possessed the power under either Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or 
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to enact Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race by places of public 
accommodation. With respect to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court indicated that Congress’s power did not extend beyond the scope of the  
self-executing provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.395 Because those  
self-executing provisions apply only when state action is involved, congressional 
acts enacted pursuant to Section 5 likewise could target only state, not private 
action.396 As for Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court assumed for 
the sake of argument that it empowered Congress to enact legislation targeting the 
so-called “badges and incidents of slavery,” but concluded that even if such a power 
existed, the denial of admission to public accommodations did not constitute a 
“badge” or “incident” of slavery, engaging in its own analysis of the meaning of 
those terms without any deference to Congress.397 
As indicated in Part I.A.2 of this Article, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones  
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.398 engaged in judicial reconstruction of its earlier decision in 
 
393. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
394. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–19, 20–25 (1883). 
395. See id. at 11. 
396. See id. at 11–19. 
397. See id. at 20–25. 
398. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968). 
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The Civil Rights Cases399 to conclude that Congress has sweeping powers to 
“enforce” the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate the “badges or incidents” of 
slavery, with deference given to a congressional determination that something 
constitutes a badge or incident of slavery. The same liberal Court that decided Jones 
issued decisions in two other cases—South Carolina v. Katzenbach400 and Katzenbach 
v. Morgan401—that construed Congress’s powers under Section 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively, to be 
similarly sweeping in scope. South Carolina echoed the Jones Court’s deferential 
language in describing Congress’s power under the Fifteenth Amendment,402 while 
Morgan appeared to go further, suggesting that Congress even had the power to 
decide that conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment and to legislate 
accordingly to prohibit that conduct.403 
Nearly thirty years later, after the Court moved in a decidedly more 
conservative direction, it revisited the question of congressional power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. At issue in City of Boerne v. Flores404 was 
the constitutionality of a federal statute that purported to “enforce” the First 
Amendment guarantee to the free exercise of religion—incorporated and applied to 
the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—pursuant to 
Congress’s Section 5 powers.405 The statute prohibited all levels of government 
from enacting laws that substantially burdened the free exercise of religion unless 
the laws were found to further a compelling governmental interest.406 Congress had 
passed the statute in response to a U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that neutral, 
generally applicable laws are not subject to such a compelling governmental interest 
test even if they have the effect of burdening the free exercise of religion.407 
In City of Boerne, the Court made clear that Congress lacked the power under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to define what constitutes a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: “Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power ‘to 
enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”408 
The City of Boerne Court acknowledged that there was language in Morgan that could 
be construed as giving Congress such a power but indicated that “[t]his is not a 
necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one.”409 It then proceeded to 
 
399. 109 U.S. at 20–21 (1883). 
400. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326–27 (1966). 
401. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648–51 (1966). 
402. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326–27. 
403. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 648–51 (1966). 
404. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997). 
405. See id. at 516. 
406. See id. at 515–16. 
407. See id. at 512–14. 
408. See id. at 519. 
409. See id. at 527–28. 
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reconstruct its earlier decision in Morgan by focusing on what the Court did, rather 
than what it wrote. 
Ultimately, City of Boerne did not swing the pendulum back to the extreme of 
The Civil Rights Cases. Instead, it acknowledged that Congress had remedial powers 
under Section 5 to prohibit a broader swath of conduct than that which is strictly 
forbidden by the self-executing portions of the Fourteenth Amendment, so long as 
there is “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted to that end.”410 As an example of a statute that 
satisfied the newly minted congruence and proportionality test, the City of Boerne 
Court cited the South Carolina Court’s analysis of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.411 
The City of Boerne test was definitely more restrictive than the Morgan test. 
Thus, although some federal statutes enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment were upheld post-City of Boerne,412 many were declared 
unconstitutional.413 Given that the Court’s decisions granting Congress broad 
power to “enforce” the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were decided by the 
same liberal Court that in Morgan acknowledged sweeping congressional power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, it seemed plausible in the wake of City of 
Boerne that those precedents were likewise subject to being overruled, or at  
least reconstructed. 
In Northwest Austin v. Holder,414 the question arose whether City of Boerne’s 
congruence and proportionality test likewise applied to provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment that 
had previously been upheld in South Carolina. However, the Court avoided deciding 
the issue by resolving the challenge on narrower statutory interpretation grounds.415 
Writing separately, Justice Thomas invoked the Court’s post-City of Boerne 
precedents involving Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to conclude that the 
statute at issue was unconstitutional.416 
Four years later, in Shelby County v. Holder,417 the Court once again revisited 
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but this time declared 
portions of the Act previously upheld in South Carolina unconstitutional. Shelby 
County, however, was unclear on whether the Act was unconstitutional because it 
failed the deferential rationality test espoused in South Carolina or if instead because 
it was subject to and failed the congruence and proportionality test of City of Boerne. 
 
410. See id. at 519–20; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000). 
411. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 530–33. 
412. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721 (2003). 
413. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States  
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67. 
414. Nw. Austin v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009). 
415. See id. at 204. 
416. See id. at 225–26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
417. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013). 
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On the one hand, the Court used the rationality language of South Carolina,418 which 
the dissent seized on to contend that the test had not changed.419 On the other 
hand, the dissent persuasively argued that what the majority required was more than 
the rationality test of South Carolina demanded.420 
The ambiguities in Shelby County have raised two related questions that lower 
federal courts and commentators are currently grappling with. First, did Shelby 
County adopt the congruence and proportionality test of City of Boerne for assessing 
laws enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment?421 And second, if 
so, does that same test apply to legislation enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, resulting in a modification of the rationality test espoused 
in Jones?422 
Post-Shelby County, the three lines of cases addressing congressional power to 
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments are vulnerable to contractive 
reconstruction. A more decisively conservative Court can reconstruct this entire set 
of cases to conclude that congressional acts purporting to enforce any of the three 
Reconstruction Amendments must be subjected to the congruence and 
proportionality test. In so concluding, the Court can focus on what the Court in 
Shelby County did rather than what it said, relying on the dissent’s arguments that 
the law at issue satisfied rationality review, thus supporting the conclusion that the 
Court implicitly endorsed a more rigorous test. Moreover, the Court could point to 
City of Boerne’s citation of South Carolina as an example of a situation that passed 
muster under the congruence and proportionality test as further proof that despite 
the rationality language used in South Carolina, it in fact applied something more 
rigorous. This would be analogous to what the Court did in its cases ramping up 
scrutiny for sex-based classifications, where it focused on what the earlier cases in 
fact did rather than their language to conclude that something more rigorous than 
rational basis review was applied. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Article has demonstrated, in assessing the actual or likely respect for 
precedent of former, sitting, or prospective U.S. Supreme Court Justices, it is not 
enough to focus on the formal doctrine of stare decisis and their fidelity to it. At few 
points in our constitutional history has the Court formally overturned precedent, 
yet the underlying doctrine has nonetheless shifted dramatically over time through 
the process of judicially reconstructing precedent. 
 
418. See id. at 556. 
419. See id. at 568–69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
420. See id. at 569–70. 
421. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, The Effect of Shelby County on Enforcement of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, 29 J.L. & POL. 397, 413 (2014); Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, From Selma to  
Ferguson: The Voting Rights Act As a Blueprint for Police Reform, 105 CAL. L. REV. 263, 328–29 (2017). 
422. See United States v. Metcalf, 881 F.3d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Cannon, 
750 F.3d 492, 502–05 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1203–05 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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Accordingly, if one is serious about fidelity to precedent, the focus of any such 
inquiry must shift away from questions about formal fidelity to stare decisis and the 
nominees must instead be asked their opinions about the process of judicial 
reconstruction. Such a shift will serve several salutary purposes. First, within the 
context of confirmation hearings of prospective U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 
asking nominees nuanced questions about their views on judicial reconstruction will 
better allow Senators and the public to assess the nominee’s likely impact on the 
future trajectory of constitutional law. Second, once the process of judicial 
reconstruction is brought to light and treated on par with overturning precedent, 
the incentive for sitting Justices to engage in judicial reconstruction will disappear. 
This will force Justices bent on changing doctrine to be transparent about what they 
are doing and why they are doing it, since it will no longer be possible to hide being 
a veil of formal fidelity to precedent. The end result may be somewhat more 
instances in which doctrine is formally overturned but overall greater fidelity to 
precedent, coupled with transparent explanations in those instances in which the 
Court opts to overturn precedent. Although the Court’s current approach provides 
a façade of stability, the approach advocated for in this Article will provide the 
foundation for a constitutional system that has a far greater degree of transparency 
and actual doctrinal stability. 
 
